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LECTURE
ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG'S LEGACIES TO
AMERICAN LABOR RELATIONS
GERALD BERENDT, GIL CORNFIELD, PETER EDELMAN, HON. MILTON
SHADUR, DAVID STEBENNE, WESLEY WILDMAN AND WILLARD WIRTZ

Dean Gilbert Johnston: Welcome to The John Marshall Law
School.
Today we are presenting the program, Arthur J.
Goldberg's Legacies To American Labor Relations. It was 100
years ago that a group of lawyers decided to put together The John
Marshall Law School. They had a vision that legal education
should be available to minorities, women and children of
immigrants who could not find legal education available at other
schools. So with that tradition we have continued, and to this day
we still believe in that.
As far as we can tell not many other people shared that vision
in those days and it was the vision of Edward Lee which then
followed on with his son and successor Dean Noble Lee. It was
during Noble Lee's time that, Justice Goldberg was on the faculty
here.
We are proud of our alumni who have come from that
background. We have provided opportunities, and from those
opportunities we have seen much achievement from our
graduates. And we think that this particular program fits in with
that along with the Justice Goldberg's particular legacy to the
world of legal education.
And today's conference is devoted to the achievements and
legacies of Justice Goldberg who we recognize as one of John
Marshall's most accomplished faculty members. Justice Goldberg
was on the faculty in the 1930's and 40's before moving from
Chicago to Washington, D.C. After he left Chicago he continued
on the faculty participating as best as he could with the distance,
which was much more difficult in those days than today.
It's really impossible to do justice to all the accomplishments
of Justice Goldberg even in several conferences, so we have
narrowed ours down today and we have chosen to focus our
conference on Justice Goldberg's legacies to the American Labor
Relations and his service as Associate Justice of the United States
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Supreme Court. In particular our speakers will talk about his
representation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, the
merger between the AFL and CIO, his service as Secretary of
Labor under President Kennedy and of course his Supreme Court
legacy.
In addition we have arranged for the conference to begin with
a special set of reminiscences of Arthur Goldberg by people who
knew and worked with him. And it's now my pleasure to introduce
my good friend and excellent colleague, Gerry Berendt, who put
the conference together and is one of our recognized experts in the
area of labor law.
Professor Gerald Berendt: Thank you so much. Before I
introduce our speakers and we commence the program I'd like to
acknowledge the contributions of many people who have made this
program possible and I'll try to make it brief. First and very
significantly to our Board of Trustees for initiating this centennial
celebration and particularly to President Louis Biro for his support
in the Arthur Goldberg program in particular. And of course our
deans, Dean Gil Johnston whom you just met, Dean John Corkery,
Former Dean Susan Brody who helped with the planning of these
programs and John McNamara, Jim Kreminski and Jane Oswald
for supporting the centennial observance. And my special thanks
to Ralph Ruebner, the professor who brought the idea of a
Goldberg conference to me and who is our centennial planning
coordinator and has been with me every step of the way with
suggestions and help.
Many administrators and support staff also contributed to the
planning of the program. In particular, I appreciate the efforts of
Event Management Director Gary Watson, Elinor Kannon, Sofia
Rodriquez, Publications Director Patrick Johanson, Rebecca
Rassmussen and our Public Relations Director Marilyn Thomas
and her support Michelle Graham, and Development Officer Ernie
Melichar who collected the old John Marshall catalogs
documenting Arthur Goldberg's service to our faculty which I'll
comment on later. Thank you also to the faculty secretary and
supervisor of secretaries, Gwen Konigsfeld.
Several members of our faculty assisted with suggestions
during the planning; Walter Kendall, Samuel Olken, and Leonard
Schrager in particular. And outside the law school I received
valuable assistance and advice from Justice Goldberg's daughter,
Barbara Cramer who is not with us today for reasons of family
illness.
Also from Ron Miller of Miller and Schakman. Judge Abner
Mikva who was originally on the program but as you know was
called to Washington to chair the conference on Holocaust assets
that were confiscated by the Nazi's and obviously could not turn
that down. Judge Milton Shadur who is sitting to my left, your
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right, who was very helpful with suggestions during the planning
of the conference. Gil Cornfield, also one of our speakers helped
with suggestions.
Professor David Stebenne who's on the
program. Former steel worker, officer Ed Sadlowski was a big
help, and Frances Gilbert, who was Arthur Goldberg's long-time
private secretary, was very helpful over the telephone, helping me
get in touch with Willard Wirtz, who was also extremely helpful in
the preparation. As a matter of fact, as late as yesterday he made
me aware of an article that was helpful in the preparation of my
remarks here later in the program.
Arthur Goldberg, as Dean Johnston pointed out, served on the
John Marshall faculty in the 1930's. We have photographs of him
during that period, and you should see the color of his hair. Also
in the 1940's and even, as Gil mentioned, into the 1950's.
During World War II he was on leave of absence from the
faculty to serve in the newly formed office of strategic services in
Washington, which you know is the predecessor to the CIA, and at
that time was headed by the legendary Wild Bill Donovan. After
the war he returned to Chicago and practiced law in the law firm
of Goldberg and Devoe, then Goldberg, Devoe and Brussell and
then on and on and on with the different name changes. He
resumed teaching at John Marshall at that time after the war. He
taught members of our famous class of 1948 which has produced
several members of our board of trustees, including President
Biro, and our long time Associate Dean, the late Helen Thatcher.
President Biro of our Board of Trustees remembers that Arthur
Goldberg was the law school's best teacher during the time he was
here.
In 1948, Arthur Goldberg again left Chicago for Washington,
this time to become general counsel to the Steelworker's Union.
He continued to be listed on the faculty but was on leave of
absence until 1955. During his extended service here at John
Marshall he taught, labor law, equity, torts, municipal
corporations, constitutional law and even bills and notes. And if
you know anything about the history of the law school and
particularly the history of Dean Noble Lee, he probably taught all
of them in the same semester.
Like any historical figure with a list of great
accomplishments, Arthur Goldberg and his career have taken on
almost mythical proportions. Indeed his later career as a Supreme
Court Justice, United Nations Ambassador and Democratic
nominee for governor of New York, have tended to crowd out in the
public memory his earlier accomplishments on behalf of the labor
movement and the working class and as the Secretary of Labor in
the first two years of the Kennedy administration. In a sense
Goldberg eclipsed himself, eclipsed his earlier record with his later
record to the extent that the public to some degree has forgotten
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his earlier accomplishments. We're going to try to remember those
today.
When we planned this conference we decided we wanted to
emphasize his early career on the behalf of the labor movement
and culminate with his service as an Associate Justice on the
United States Supreme Court. We also wanted to humanize our
subject, and to that end the first part of the program is devoted to
reminiscences about Arthur Goldberg. And it will give me great
pleasure to introduce the gentlemen who have agreed to
participate in that part of the program.
Our moderator for this part of the program is Judge Milton I.
Shadur, who is the Senior United States District Court Judge for
the Northern District of Illinois. Judge Shadur knew Arthur
Goldberg for more than four decades as a law associate, as a
partner in a law firm that bore his and Arthur Goldberg's name, as
a lawyer for Arthur Goldberg when Arthur Goldberg entered
public service, and of course as a friend.
Also sitting at the far end of the couch, Professor Willard
Wirtz, who succeeded Arthur Goldberg as Secretary of Labor for
President Kennedy and then served as Secretary of Labor through
the Johnson administration. Professor Wirtz was Under Secretary
of Labor when Arthur Goldberg was Secretary of Labor. In
addition, he's a distinguished law professor most prominently at
Northwestern University School of Law, and most recently in San
Diego. He is a noted arbitrator and mediator, and time does not
permit us to list the various fact-finding boards, Taft-Hartley
boards, mediations, committees and government appointments
that W. Willard Wirtz has held.
Our third participant in the reminiscences is Professor Peter
Edelman. He joins us from Washington where he is a Professor of
Law at Georgetown University Law Center. He served as the law
school's Associate Dean in the 1980's. He also served as Justice
Goldberg's law clerk at the United States Supreme Court from
1962 to 1963. He too has held a number of government posts,
including Counselor to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services, and Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation at
that department.
Again Abner Mikva apologizes, as does Barbara Goldberg
Cramer, for not being able to join us for this part of the program,
but I'm sure you'll agree with me that the memories will be
priceless. Judge Shadur.
Judge Milton Shadur: Well, I'm constantly reminded, most
often by our Court of Appeals, how important it is that I be careful
about the language that I use. Sometimes that reminder comes in
gentle forms, sometimes not so gentle. But anyway what I did,
which is sort of unusual for me, is to write down the things that I
wanted to talk about.
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It does not of course need any explanation or amplification to
tell you simply how gratifying it is for me to share with all of you,
and with my colleagues on the program, in this celebration of a
great man's life. There was, I must admit, one troubling note
when I learned of my requested role to serve as moderator over the
part of the proceedings labeled "Reminiscences." As I suspect is
true of everyone in the human condition, my mind's eye holds a
much younger image of myself that's unwilling to acknowledge
that I qualify for the anecdotal category. But consistently with my
adherence to the realist school of jurisprudence, I've managed to
banish that element of self-deception. Once having overcome that
doubt, I thought that some insights into Arthur Goldberg, the
private person, might profitably illuminate the public person
about whom we'll be talking this afternoon, and so I turn to that
task.
All of us are familiar with, if indeed we don't know by heart,
these lovely lines by Robert Frost:
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I - I took the one less traveled by,
And that has made all the difference.
Less poetically, either Henny Youngman or some other
master of one-liners has said that if Moses had only turned right
instead of left after the Hebrews crossed the parted Red Sea,
Israel would be an oil-rich country instead of having to be content
with just milk and honey.
Like the narrator in Frost's poem, I too was fortunate enough
to take the road less traveled by. For me the timing of John
Marshall's first century celebration, and of today's program, are
extraordinarily serendipitous: It was almost exactly a half-century
ago, give or take literally just a few days, when I first set foot on
that road. In late November or early December 1948, I had just
sent to the printer the last issue of the University of Chicago Law
Review for which I had the editorial responsibility as Editor-inChief, and I was able to turn to the question of how I was going to
manage to support my young wife, our year-and-a-half old son and
myself on graduation at the end of December.
One of my
professors was good enough to tell me about a three-lawyer firm
that he understood to be looking to hire an associate. All three
were of an age-each about 40. In any event, I went for an
interview.
That firm was Goldberg, Devoe and Brussell.
And
parenthetically, the reason that they were in the hiring market
was because someone else had been hired earlier but hadn't
worked out-and whatever shortcomings the partners in the firm
may have perceived about my predecessor during that brief
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relationship, he did manage to father the playwright David
Mamet.
But to return to my own narration, I first met Carl Devoe,
then Abe Brussell. Earlier that year, Arthur had been selected as
the new general counsel of the CIO and the United Steelworkers of
America-a shift from his background, which was that of a general
practitioner with increasing emphasis on the labor practice, to
becoming a full-time labor lawyer. Although he and Dorothy
hadn't moved to Washington, where the CIO's small building a few
blocks from the White House was located, Arthur was spending
about as much time in the air between Chicago and Washington
(with side trips to Steelworker headquarters in Pittsburgh) as he
was spending on the ground in any of the three places.
So I got to meet Arthur a very short time later, on his next
trip home to Chicago, after Carl had told him about our meeting
and the partners had decided among themselves to offer me a job,
subject to my passing muster with Arthur-unanimity of decision
was of course essential.
That first meeting presented in
microcosm two things that defined Arthur both as a lawyer and as
a man-lessons that placed me at the beginning of the lesstraveled road and that I too tried to live by thereafter.
First, even though the firm was then an amalgam of a
substantial broad general practice, representing small businesses
and individuals in every conceivable area of legal work, something
that was highly unusual when coupled with a labor law practice on
the side of labor, the Steelworkers were the largest single client in
terms of firm income. My guess is that it represented something
in the 20 to 25% range of the firm's gross billings. But Arthur said
to me that it didn't matter how large or important a client was-if
keeping the representation ever meant the need to do something
or to take some position that we regarded as fundamentally wrong
legally or ethically; or in any way contrary to our deeply-held
convictions, even if not perhaps technically a violation of the thendefined Canons of Ethics, a lawyer had to be prepared to tell the
client to go to hell-to take its legal business elsewhere. As
Arthur put it, all of us should have enough confidence in our legal
abilities to believe that we could survive economically without that
important client, to rebuild the practice even if it meant some
tough times in the interim.
That was brave talk. Though I wasn't of course privy to the
numbers at the time, the three lawyers were then occupying
unprepossessing offices as subtenants of another firm at 231 South
LaSalle Street. My tendencies as a squirrel have permitted me to
dredge up at home the firm financial statement of three years
later, when I was already a partner, and I can tell you that the
firm's gross income from fees in that year, including Arthur's
Washington compensation from his general counsel position that
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went into the pot-mind you, gross income, not the partners' net
income-came to the munificent sum of $108,000. So as you might
guess the figures at my time of hiring, the end of 1948, had to have
been appreciably lower.
But whether brave or merely rash, Arthur's statement of
principle was firm. It provided me with a major insight into him
and into the other partners, for that matter, and I tried to follow
that polestar during the next three decades during which I went
from brand new associate to the senior active partner in the firm
before being appointed to the federal bench.
There was a second statement of principle that Arthur voiced
in that first meeting, not as a matter of preaching but as a simple
statement of fact.
To paraphrase that message, Arthur
emphasized that we must never forget that as lawyers we are
accorded a monopoly position. No one can practice the profession
without a license. And that special privilege, with its combined
blessing of education and opportunity, carries with it a
corresponding societal responsibility-a duty to return full value
to society, to engage in some important social good even though it
pays less than market price for our services or more likely involves
no payment at all. That early notion of a duty to engage in pro
bono activity of some kind, without the law firm either limiting or
imposing any collective view on any individual's decision about
what he or she considered to be a social good, set Arthur apart not
only from the attitudes of that day but from law firm thinking and
practice in decades to follow.
In my view, it also set the firm-which remained committed
to that notion over the years-apart from the mine run of
practitioners. Although you're free to consider this as overly
simplistic or as a matter of overweening pride or both, I do believe
that ongoing mindset was a major factor in the unique history of
the firm, which never numbered more than 20 or some lawyers, in
ultimately counting among its alumni judges at every level of the
federal judiciary: Arthur on the Supreme Court, Ab Mikva on the
Court of Appeals, I myself and since then Elaine Bucklo as District
Judges, Ron Barliant as a Bankruptcy Judge and earlier Elaine as
a Magistrate Judge. And on the state side of the ledger, just a few
years after he left our firm Abe Brussell became a state trial court
judge, and he served with great distinction on that bench until his
untimely death.
If our good friend and partner Carl Devoe were still among
us, I know he would be sure to tell you-as he later told me-about
the origin of the firm. In World War II both Arthur and Carl were
in the OSS, the CIA's predecessor, under famed General Wild Bill
Donovan-Arthur was in the Army and Carl in the Navy. They'd
been friends in Chicago before the war, and they made
arrangements to meet to talk about their plans if both were
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fortunate enough to survive. That meeting turned out to take
place on a night in Casablanca-not at Rick's Caf6 Americana with
Humphrey Bogart as their restaurateur-bar-owner host, but on
the rooftop of a low-lying building during the wartime-enforced
blackout. As Carl told it, the two of them were engaged in a
serious discussion about joining forces as partners in the practice
of law if and when they got out of the service when Arthur, who
was facing Carl, grew strangely silent. Carl turned around to see
what had engaged Arthur's rapt attention and saw a nubile young
woman framed in a lighted window across the street in the process
of disrobing. So the firm had still another unique distinctiondoubtless being the only law firm ever to have had its
organizational meeting take place in an exotic setting, disrupted
by an amateur but still highly effective striptease.
To return to more mundane matters, after I was hired I
quickly learned another attribute of Arthur and his two partners:
the willingness, once a judgment had been made about someone's
ability, to back it to the hilt. It was a heady experience for a
fledgling lawyer to practice in that environment. During my first
year and a half or so in the practice, I had the privilege of handling
on my own perhaps a dozen or more matters in appellate courts, in
addition to the more humdrum everyday aspects of the practice.
Just one example: Late in 1949 or early in 1950, Arthur got the
blessing of Philip Murray, then head of the CIO and the
Steelworkers, to weigh in as amicus curiae in the United States
Supreme Court in McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, a
challenge to the refusal of the University of Oklahoma to admit an
African-American candidate for a Doctorate in Education, except
under demeaning segregated conditions - sitting apart at a
designated desk in an anteroom adjoining the classroom, being
unauthorized to use the desk in the library's regular reading room
(again relegated to a separate desk elsewhere), and sitting at a
designated table and eating at a different time from other students
in the school cafeteria. Arthur asked me to prepare and file the
brief.
It may have been another instance of foolhardiness-I was
just one year out of law school, not yet a partner though I had been
told that was shortly in the offing-but Arthur left it entirely up to
me to write and file that brief without clearing it with him, even
though his name and not mine had to appear because I wasn't yet
a member of the bar of the Supreme Court. When nearly 30 years
later I was putting together my response to the questionnaire from
the Senate Judiciary Committee for my own consideration as a
District Court nominee, I dredged up a copy of that brief-and I
was both surprised and I confess especially pleased that entirely
on my own I had committed the CIO to a position urging that
Plessy v. Ferguson should be overruled and that "separate but
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equal" should be excised from our jurisprudence-and that was
four years before the decision in Brown v. Board of Education.
Talk about rashness and brashness!
Even though I had forgotten that, and even though I had also
blocked from my mind what it might have done to Arthur's
position if Phil Murray had not shared that point of view, I did
remember a disturbing call that I got from Arthur immediately
after I had filed the brief directly with the Supreme Court, sending
copies to Arthur in Washington:
"What are you doing using a non-union printshop for one of
our briefs?"
Panic set in-in those days all briefs were printed, and I had
used (as we did for all of the firm's appellate work) the GunthorpWarren Printing Company here in Chicago. So I called Larry Veit
there:
"Don't you use union labor?"
His response:
'Yes, of course, but most of our customers prefer that we not
disclose that on the briefs."
When I relayed that information to a much reassured Arthur,
he told me:
"Never let any filing go out without the union bug." And so he
added a less inspiring but equally permanent mark on my psyche.
Well, it's impossible to encapsulate the many years of
association that followed -- the time until Arthur left us in
January 1961 to join the Kennedy Cabinet as Secretary of Labor,
his few years there, the ensuing three years on the Supreme
Court, the period of his United Nations ambassadorship and his
ensuing years in private life. During all of that time, the
separation of space and time would fall away whenever a call-or
more rarely a visit-came from Arthur. Invariably he would begin
with "Well, counselor.. ." before launching into the question that
he wanted to ask or the subject that he wanted to talk about. And
I never risked asking him the question whether he was less than
serious with that label. For me the idea that Arthur would ever
come to me for my views or my advice represented the ultimate in
compliments, however undeserved.
Well, I want to desist now in favor of my colleagues on this
"Reminiscences" section. If time permits a bit later, I may have
the occasion to chime in again, but in the meantime let me turn to
my colleagues in this "Reminiscences" section of the program.
Although Willard Wirtz would perhaps more logically come
next, he has said that what he'd like to do is to make himself
available as a target for questioning. So instead, I'm going to turn
to another distinguished guest, Peter Edelman. Peter.
Professor Peter Edelman: Thank you Judge and thank you so
much for what you said. That was just wonderful to listen to.
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Justice Goldberg made such a difference in my life, so to hear you
start out with what it was like when you first came into the firm
resonates strongly. I take up the story from where you left off in
the sense that in 1962 he chose me to clerk for him. I was
supposed to clerk for Justice Frankfurter. Having clerked for
Judge Friendly on the Second Circuit and having gone to the
Harvard Law School, I had been indoctrinated-I hope that is a
reasonable word-with the idea of neutral principles in the law,
which sounds good but of course works out to be not so neutral in
practice.
And so when Justice Goldberg replaced Justice
Frankfurter and David Filvaroff and I ended up clerking for
Justice Goldberg, I had no idea what was about to happen to me,
and was quickly immersed in a very different judicial philosophy.
It took me a little while to get adjusted, but it made a mark that
has lasted to this day and for which I'm very grateful.
He was not only an enormous influence on me philosophically
in terms of the values and views that I have about the law, but he
made a recommendation to me that affected everything else that
happened to me later on. You talk about the road less traveled.
What if, Justice Frankfurter had not fallen ill and I had clerked
for him? What would I have ended up doing with my life? Justice
Goldberg took an enormous interest in anybody who came into his
orbit. Everybody became part of the extended family. You went to
Passover Seder, it didn't matter whether you were Jewish or not,
you came to Passover Seder at his house. The crowd just got
bigger and bigger. That's probably why he had to leave Chicagobecause he needed to start a new crowd in Washington. By the
time I came along there were probably-I don't know, it spilled out
into room after room in his house-forty, fifty people at these
Seders.
Justice Goldberg asked me one day what I was going to do
when the clerkship was over? I said I didn't know. Justice
Frankfurter always told his law clerks go home, go back to where
you grew up-not bad advice-put your roots down, that's where
you know people. Justice Goldberg was certainly not opposed to
that, but he said, "Go into the government." He said, "There won't
be many Administrations like this one in your lifetime"--President
Kennedy was still alive then, of course. I thought, Franklin
Roosevelt was the only President I knew until I was 10, and then
there was Truman, and Eisenhower was a little bad, but what did
he mean there were not going to be that many like it in my life
time? But all right, if that's what he said I should do, I would do
it. Everything else that's happened to me stemmed from that and
I'm very grateful.
Justice Goldberg served as the flower person, I think that
would be the correct way to describe it, at my wedding. When
Marian and I were married in the back yard of a friend's house in
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McLean, Virginia and the Reverend William Sloane Coffin with
whom Marian had lived at Yale Law School officiated, Justice
Goldberg was kind of the all purpose attendant, sort of the best
man. We didn't have a large group of attendants, so when the
time came for Marian to hand her flowers to somebody, Justice
Goldberg was standing there so he played that role as well.
It was that kind of a relationship. Marian's father had died a
long time before that. My father, I'm glad to say, was still alive,
but the Justice was a second grandfather to our children. He was
so formal in public, always had that three piece suit on I think
except at the farm, maybe even sometimes at the farm, but in fact
it was so paradoxical. He was warm and wonderful privately.
Judge Milton Shadur: Of course he had to have a vest
because of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers.
Professor Peter Edelman: You've just explained something.
It's like the union bug. He had a union bug about wearing a vest.
So he was really so warm and wonderful as opposed to that
formality that people saw. I do have to add, if we're going to
puncture myths, he became a lot more protocol conscious as he got
older. As his numerous titles receded into the past, he was more
and more insistent on being treated as though they were still
current.
But that was paradoxical. I don't know anybody in my
experience who was such a distinguished person and absolutely
continued to grow with the times as much as Justice Goldberg did.
It would have been so easy for his development to have stopped at
any step along the way. We know so many people who were
liberals during that period of time, especially those who were
involved in all the struggles against Communism, as Arthur
Goldberg indeed was, who stopped in the 1960's or in the 1970's,
and said, that's it, there are all these new issues and I'm not
interested. Justice Goldberg kept right on growing. He co-chaired
with Ramsey Clark, a commission of inquiry into the Fred
Hampton case and the treatment of the Black Panthers because he
felt that a wrong had been done. It wasn't that he agreed with
their politics, but he felt that a wrong had been done. He
represented Curt Flood to challenge the baseball reserve clause.
He was always growing, always there.
And he was always on the telephone. He called up all the
time. He loved those titles. He would call up and he would say,
Professor-and you know he didn't say this is the Justice callingyou just knew who it was on the other end of the phone.
One time in the 80's-I didn't even have tenure yet at
Georgetown-somebody asked me if I wanted to be considered to
be Dean of the American University Law School which is a fine
law school in Washington. So I called him up and I said, "What do
you think?" He said, "You should be dean, that's a better title
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than professor." He liked those titles.
I might say a word about his departure from the Supreme
Court which was, I think, a really unfortunate thing that
happened for all of us. There is a dispute among those who knew
him well, because there are some who think he had gotten restless
on the Court. My impression was that the Court was the
fulfillment of his life's dream and that he was very deeply fulfilled.
But he also had two characteristics that in this circumstance were
fatal flaws. One was his ego, which was not small, and the other
was his immigrant patriotism. Mrs. Goldberg's mother was ill,
was in fact in the hospital very gravely ill at the time. The Justice
was there with Dorothy, watching over her mother and deeply
involved in that drama. President Johnson called him up at the
hospital and said, "I need your advice about who I should appoint
to replace Adlai Stevenson at the United Nations." Goldberg
named a number of people. Johnson was really good at this, as we
know, so everyone that Goldberg would suggest Johnson would tell
him why that was not the right person, and finally he said, "It's
you Arthur, I have to have you. You're the only person who can
bring peace and you owe it to your country." Johnson always knew
his man.
This is vivid in my mind. We all remember where we were
when President Roosevelt died or President Kennedy was killed
and so on. I remember exactly where this conversation took place,
when he told me why he had decided to leave the Court and take
the UN job, standing in front of the Methodist Building across the
street from the Supreme Court. I was working in the Senate at
the time and I was on my way to a meeting and I ran into him. I
said, "What is going on? Why are you doing this?" And he told me
this story. He said, "Peter, if I can bring peace, if I can make a
contribution to that, it's greater than anything I'll ever do on the
Supreme Court." So he left the Court which I think was a great
tragedy, and went to the United Nations.
Of course, he made great contributions, he was an author of
Resolution 242 and so many other things that happened at the
United Nations. I don't know of any understanding specifically
that he had with President Johnson about whether he would be
put back on the Court. I always thought there was, but Goldberg
had too much dignity and stature to say one way or the other. But
the reason I think there must have been is because it would be
Johnson's style. He liked to have something to hold over people,
he was very good at that. In any case, Goldberg broke with him on
the war and, very characteristically, never said anything publicly.
But he realized that he had been had, if I can put it in words of
one syllable. You may remember that Johnson sent him on a
worldwide peace making tour in the Christmas of 1965 that
everybody else knew was absolutely a sham. It gradually dawned
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on him that Johnson was not about making peace and that he was
being used. He began to agitate internally that there should be a
bombing halt so there could be real negotiation. It made Johnson
really mad at him.
Finally, Goldberg resigned over the disagreement. He never
said a word about it publicly. Many of you know I quit the
government recently over my disagreement with a policy and was
public about it although I tried to do it in a calibrated way. That
was not Arthur Goldberg's style. He believed that you kept your
disputes internal. So he never said anything.
He left the
government and of course was not put back on the Supreme Court
because he had broken with Johnson and that was the end of that.
It took tremendous courage for him to do that. It was such a
statement, so consistent, so representative of who he was that he
never went public with it and he gave up what I believe was a
promise to get back on the Court, although of course I can't prove
that.
Then we come to his candidacy for Governor of New York and
I have to tell you that was not his finest hour. I went as the
deputy campaign manager. I was the only former law clerk who
knew anything about politics and so I was kind of drafted. Steve
Smith, the Kennedy brother-in-law who I knew quite well, pulled
me into it as well as pulling in Goldberg himself. He was up
against Nelson Rockefeller.
You just didn't defeat Nelson
Rockefeller. Nelson Rockefeller had an unlimited supply of money.
If he ran out of campaign contributions he went into his own
pocket and had ways to put that money in very useful places. It
was going to be tough.
On the other hand, Goldberg started out doing very well in
the polls. I think he had this idea that the way you got a public
office was to get appointed. He didn't quite get the idea that you
were supposed to go out and get votes. He'd been Secretary of
Labor and he'd been Supreme Court Justice and he'd been the
United Nations Ambassador. In fact, he went somewhere and
somebody said to him, "You've had all these titles, which one do
you prefer?" Of course, you're the candidate, you're supposed to
say, "Oh, just call me Arthur." He said, "I prefer Mr. Justice."
Homer Bigart, the great war correspondent of the New York
Times, was in the last years of his career and was assigned to
cover Goldberg. He went around with him one day and in a news
story the next day-it wasn't too prominently placed, didn't hurt
as bad as some other things-the first line was, I spent a week
with Arthur Goldberg last night.
I said one time, "You have to be critical of Nelson Rockefeller's
record on a whole series of things besides saying what you're going
to do." He said, "I said he was a failure, what do you want?"
He thought that the thing that would really win it is if we
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wrote a book. He thought if we got all of his positions out there
everyone would see how thoughtful he was and he would win. If
you judged it by the staff we had working on it, he would have
been governor for life. We had Stephen Breyer, we had Alan
Dershowitz, we had Donna Shalala, who had just gotten her Ph.D.
from the Maxwell School. We wrote an absolutely terrific book,
which nobody wanted to publish, so he paid a little money and we
put it out on a private basis.
That was an experience that I had to share with you, the
whole thing about the campaign. I vowed at the end of that
campaign that I was never going to speak to him again, I was
finished. It was so awful and he had been so terrible, but of course
it didn't work. Very shortly thereafter the phone would ring, I
became the Vice President of the University of Massachusetts, and
this voice would say, "Mr. Vice President." And, we'd go with the
kids out to the farm with the family and he was so wonderful to
the kids. It lasted for the rest of his life and we treasured it. Such
a tremendous loss when he passed away. His health hadn't been
good but there was really no indication that we were going to lose
him. His mind was fine, his telephone finger was active.
But Dorothy's passing broke his heart. So it was a great loss,
it was a great loss to lose her who we loved, and a great loss to lose
him.
SPEAKER: Well we're waiting with an expecting ear, tell us
something about the labor department in that formative period.
Professor Willard Wirtz: Following these two marvelously
warm statements, I think of the old story about the teacher
putting a question to student A with apologies about whether he
had made it clear or not. Student A said, "Yes, professor, it's a
very good question but I'm frank to say I'm unprepared." So the
teacher turned to student B, whose response was, 'Well I'm fully
prepared but I don't think the question has anything to do with
the subject assigned for the day." This left student C, who replied,
"I'm fully prepared, and I think it's an excellent question, but I
have nothing to add to what the two previous speakers have said."
Arthur Goldberg was opposed to starting a speech with any
kind of canned story. Peter has talked about the fact that Arthur
was a very proud man and part of his effectiveness was in the fact
that he impressed other people so strongly. It was part of the way
he broke some of those labor disputes. He had authority and he
used that authority. I believe he thought that the humor
diminished his dignity just a little.
I'm glad you both spoke about Dorothy. Dorothy was so large
a part of Arthur Goldberg that for us to try and reminisce without
making that very clear would be a great mistake. It came through
more subtly than it usually does in a case of that kind of human
relationship. She was so good at it.
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There is time for only one or two reminiscences. I remember
first our being together here in late August or early September,
1962, trying to settle the Northwestern Railroad strike. We were
in the hotel room and the phone rang. I realized that Arthur was
talking with President Kennedy. Then he turned me and said,
"The President wants to speak to you." The President asked me to
be Secretary of Labor, saying that he was moving Arthur to the
Supreme Court. The only point in telling this story is that I
It's
became Secretary of Labor because of Arthur Goldberg.
another illustration of what Peter was talking about. Every one of
us who became close to Arthur had a mentor for life. I didn't
really know John Kennedy very well. I had no real eligibility for
the Secretary of Labor role. Arthur Goldberg was simply doing for
me what he had done for so many other people.
My other recollection involves one of the last times I was
working with Arthur. This would have been about 1985. I was
teaching for part of a semester at Arizona State Law School. It
was a brand new law school, a small law school. Arthur spent a
lot of his time the last ten or fifteen years of his life talking at
various law schools. It was rarely one of the big name law schools;
he wasn't looking for points.
Arthur had agreed to visit my class, and I had arranged for
the students to read for that day an opinion he had written when
he was on the Supreme Court. He didn't ask what he should talk
about, but he had requested that a table with nine chairs around it
be placed in the front part of the classroom. When I introduced
him to the class, he immediately assumed command. Arthur was
in command of every situation he ever faced. That was part of his
effectiveness.
Glancing around the room, Arthur asked eight students to
come forward and join him at the table. Although his selection
seemed to be at random, I don't need to tell you, that he managed
to select three minority group students and that four of those he
included were women.
"Now," he said, "it's Friday. You are members of the Supreme
Court. I'm the Chief Justice. We are going to talk about this case
we just heard argued. I am going to call first on the one of you
who was selected last, and then we are going around the table.
Now, sir, how do you think we should decide this case?"
It went on for forty minutes. Every student in that room
learned more about that case than about any other in the course.
Everybody there was thinking. And I learned more about the
pedagogical value of student participation than I had in most of a
lifetime of teaching. Arthur Goldberg was, in all the roles he
played, a superb teacher.
This room is full today of people who are here because we
realize that Arthur Goldberg could put our ideals into operation.
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He was a masterful translator of these ideals, "liberal" ideals. He
was a supreme activist. He put into effect what you and I
believed. His legacy won't be marked in terms of particular
monuments or achievements, but in terms of those human
relationships which he had with so many people.
He changed our lives by believing in always better and bigger
things. He was never content just to win a case or to win a
particular argument or even to negotiate a particular settlement.
He always found a context of something more important. He would
say to law students today, "Stop thinking in terms of being just
lawyer/advocate.
Think in terms of being lawyer/statesman."
Arthur changed the way a great many people in this country felt
about labor and about the liberal ideas.
He taught us the
importance of putting people in the first place instead of someplace
else on down the line.
We are all really here to say thank you. It's just that simple.
Voice: One last plea to Judge Shadur about a story that he
told me last night involving Esther Kurgans. Are you willing to
share that? Again, Mrs. Kurgans was Arthur's mother-in-law.
Judge Milton Shadur: Esther Kurgans lived with Arthur and
Dorothy in their house in Washington. On the night before Arthur
was going to be installed as a Supreme Court Justice, he had a
small party for a number of us: former partners in the firm, a
couple of long-standing clients and friends, (Jack Potofsky, for
example, from the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America),
and the only member of the Supreme Court who was invited, Chief
Justice Warren. And to talk about somebody who embraced
everybody whom he encountered, Chief Justice Warren had that
quality as well. And he was talking with Mrs. Kurgans. Though I
won't try to emulate her accent, which was delightful of itself, the
Chief Justice said to her:
"Ms. Kurgans, how does it feel to have Arthur on the Court?"
She thought for a second and said:
"Well, Mr. Chief Justice, I'll tell you. That it should happen
to Arthur I'm not surprised. That it should happen to me, I'm
surprised."
SPEAKER: While our panel retreats from the platform here
I'm going to tell you a little bit about the next part of the program.
The next part of the program is devoted to Arthur Goldberg's
legacy to the American labor movement. If you've read our first
speaker's book, that is David Stebenne's book, you know that we
could have devoted a full day's conference to the subject of Arthur
Goldberg's contributions to the labor movement alone. Doctor
Stebenne teaches Modem American, Political, Economic Labor
and Legal History at Ohio State University. He earned is BA from
Yale University and his Ph.D. and JD degrees from Columbia
University. Before entering academia Professor Stebenne held
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several governments posts including Legislative Assistant to a
member of the United States House of Representatives. And he
also worked in three Washington area law firms.
In 1996, Oxford Press published his book, ARTHUR GOLDBERG,
NEW DEAL LIBERAL. His other publications include an article on
the Eisenhower Presidency and he is presently working on two
new articles on labor, business and government. And also on
another book whose working title is Arthur Larsen, Modern
Republican which it has occurred to me is an oxymoron
nevertheless.
I'll introduce your second speaker who will also be talking on
this subject after Doctor Stebenne's speech. Doctor Stebenne.
Professor David Stebenne: Thank you. It's a pleasure to be
here today, in a room full of people knowledgeable about and
interested in Arthur Goldberg. That's the biographer's dream.
And actually, just to put my own presence in perspective, the way
I think of it sometimes, Arthur Goldberg had an impact on three
generations really: His brothers and sisters from the labor
movement days, his 60's children of whom Peter Edelman is a very
distinguished example, and then his grandchildren, young people
that he taught either formally or informally during the period of
his semi-retirement, especially during the 1980's. And I'm one of
Arthur Goldberg's metaphorical grandchildren. So I never knew
him when he was on the TV, in other words I was a little kid, I
came along later. And what I'm going to give you is an historian's
perspective from someone who was not in any sense a
contemporary.
All right, so here goes. In the spring of 1960, Fortune
Magazine published a profile of Arthur Goldberg under the
heading, "Labors Plenipotentiary." And the timing of that article
could hardly have been more appropriate. For Goldberg in 1960
was in the last of his nearly 13 years as a truly major figure in the
American labor movement. The article's title was also very apt.
THE CONCISE OxFORD DICTIONARY defines "plenipotentiary" as, "A
person, especially a diplomat invested with the full power of
independent action."
And that one word described Arthur
Goldberg's role as well as any one word could.
It was March of 1948 that Goldberg first arrived as a highlevel figure in the CIO. As is now well known, the President of the
CIO (and of the Steelworkers Union), Philip Murray, persuaded
Goldberg in March of 1948 to accept the post of CIO and
Steelworker's general counsel. And the literal explanation of what
Goldberg was suppose to do in those two jobs is deceptively simple.
For the CIO Goldberg was to become the chief Washington
lobbyist. For the Steelworkers he was to become the chief contract
negotiator. And had he been a rather narrow person in terms of
knowledge, experience and ability, perhaps that's all Goldberg
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would have done for the labor movement. And note when I say
that, that would have been a lot. Instead, Goldberg, who was very
broad in terms of knowledge, experience and ability, became a
strategist and emissary for the American labor movement, who
operated as an equal at the highest levels of decision making even
though he was never an elected union official. He was almost a
unique figure in the history of the American union movement.
From the late 40's through 1960 Goldberg played an important
part in all of the major developments that took place in the
American labor movement. And this is interesting, a challenge for
me, to boil down in any coherent way a short list of the most
important things he did. Especially because, as Willard Wirtz had
stated so clearly and elegantly, much of what he did was almost a
kind of mentoring or facilitating or developing of other people.
I came up with five, for what they're worth and here they are.
First, Goldberg managed the process of ousting communistdominated unions from the CIO. Second, he won an historic court
decision that made pensions a legitimate collective bargaining
concern. Third, he more than anyone else, except George Meany,
negotiated the merger of the AFL and the CIO. Fourth, Goldberg
headed the effort within the union movement to attack labor
corruption. And fifth, Goldberg managed to bring about enough
labor support for John F. Kennedy as to make him the winner of
the 1960 presidential election. And just doing justice to all five of
these would take more time than we have time today. I'm going to
talk about the last three of these five. And if you have questions
about any of them I'd be happy to answer them.
And so let me start with Goldberg's third major achievement.
Negotiating with George Meany, the merger of the AFL and CIO.
In part Goldberg was able to bring this about, the merger, simply
because the opportunity arose on his watch. In other words, when
Goldberg was a leading figure on the labor scene. Partly it is the
result of timing. As long as the AFL President, William Green,
and the CIO President, Philip Murray, were in charge of their
respective federations, prospects for merger were never very good.
These men had clashed for too long over too many issues to be able
to bring about such a reunification. But when both of them
suddenly died, however, in late 1952 an opportunity for merger
finally arose. Even so this was not an easy process. To my
generation the notion that there's such a thing as the AFL-CIO
seems rather natural despite the rather awkward sounding
acronym. But there was nothing easy or inevitable about this
merger process in the 1950's.
The new federation presidents, the successors to Green and
Murray, George Meany for the AFL and Walter Reuther for the
CIO were both interested in merger, in the abstract, but did not
get along well, because they were very different people. And they
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also disagreed about many things. And here is where Arthur
Goldberg made a real difference.
With Reuther's approval
Goldberg drafted an agreement to ban AFL and CIO raiding of
each other's members. And for those of you not in the union
movement or very familiar with it, this will seem technical. But it
really was at the heart of the matter: We're going to stop trying to
steal each other's members by formal agreement. And this was
the key issue that had defeated all previous discussions about an
AFL-CIO merger. This no-raiding agreement which Goldberg
drafted and Meany soon accepted without substantial revision was
modeled on one Goldberg had drawn up earlier for the CIO itself,
to keep the various CIO unions from wasting time and money
trying to raid each other.
And the no-raiding agreement that Goldberg devised and
Meany accepted, established patterns that the later merger
agreement would follow.
Among these key patterns was an
emphasis on preserving as much of the status quo as was possible.
The agreement emphasized gradual, incremental change,
adjudicating disputes in a formal legalistic way and gave the
arbitrator who resolved such disputes a good deal of discretion.
The no-raiding agreement also prefigured the AFL-CIO merger in
one of its ratification provisions. The agreement became effective
upon its acceptance by the executive board of each union rather
than the overall convention, which would have been a much more
difficult process to manage and bring about.
What helped persuade the various union executive boards to
go along with the no-raiding agreement was a study conducted by
a small number of union leaders from both federations. Again
Goldberg makes a real difference here, he knows in his heart that
raiding overall isn't helping. Let's have a study, he argues.
Unlike some people in labor, Arthur Goldberg was never adverse
to help from academics or from academic methodologies. The
study found that even though some individual unions in the AFL
and CIO had been benefiting from raiding, overall the federations
were coming out about even. This gave Goldberg and Meany a
very strong argument: what is the point of unions spending a lot
of time and money on raiding if the overall result for the AFL and
the CIO was negligible? And this argument helped convince
unions representing a majority of the members of the AFL and the
CIO to accept the no-raiding agreement in May, 1954. And the
stage was then set for a true merger discussion and negotiation.
Goldberg believed in the merger. It was controversial then
and to some degree it still is even today, for several reasons.
Goldberg thought the competition between the AFL and CIO was
wasteful and did not serve the needs of American workers. He
also thought that the effect of the merger over the long term, and
Arthur Goldberg was very definitely a visionary, would be to force
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both the AFL and the CIO to move toward a more centrist
economic and political position similar to the one occupied by the
Steelworkers Union. The merger also made sense, he felt in the
mid 1950's, because the CIO had decided to support Truman's
Containment Policy in the late '40's, thereby putting an end to
differences of opinion with the AFL over foreign policy issues.
Similarly the CIO had shifted toward a more moderate, domestic
agenda from the left. And the AFL had shifted toward a more
moderate domestic agenda from the right.
Goldberg was not only a visionary, but a realist.
He
understood that the CIO stood to gain from a merger in the mid
1950's because the AFL was increasing its strength relative to the
newer and smaller CIO. To have waited would likely have meant,
Goldberg believed, a future merger on terms less favorable to the
CIO's core values. And I think he was very right about that.
Making the merger talks even more urgent was one other
provision of the no-raiding pact. Goldberg and Meany came up
with the idea that the pact should expire at the end of 1955 unless
both parties had moved towards merger.
So not only does
Goldberg remove-with Meany's help-the key stumbling block,
Goldberg also gives both parties a sense of urgency which is one
way of facilitating any kind of negotiation.
Even though all of these things had been done in advance, the
road to merger during the second half of 1954 and throughout
1955 proved to be a fairly bumpy one. Walter Reuther spoke for
an influential minority within the CIO which strongly and
vociferously objected to the AFL's stands on such issues as labor
corruption and civil rights. There were AFL affiliates such as the
Carpenters and the Teamsters that strongly objected to any
crackdown led by the new labor federation on corruption within
the member unions. And there were also personality conflicts
among the various union chieftains that made matters difficult.
I once asked Fran Gilbert, who knew Arthur Goldberg so well,
if she could give me a short illustration of the difference in
temperament between Reuther and Goldberg. And she said
Justice Goldberg would always go to lunch with George Meany
even if it was purely social, even if it took an hour, even if there
was a lot to do, because Meany liked to have lunch, he liked the
break. Walter Reuther's idea of lunch was a chocolate bar, kept in
his jacket pocket. And this is not to diminish Walter Reuther, he
had a sense of urgency, that things needed to get done. But as a
result, the difference in temperament between Reuther and Meany
was enormous. If they had taken a lot of pictures of those three
men, (like Roosevelt and Churchill and Stalin) of Meany, Goldberg
and Reuther, Goldberg would always have been in the middle, like
Roosevelt, facilitating. And that's really what he represented in
the union movement.
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So how did this agreement finally work? Well Goldberg, (once
again his superior legal skills make a difference here) says, "Let
me draft a proposed merger agreement. I'll do it." He worked very
hard on it. And then he took it to the CIO leadership and very
cleverly maneuvered them into going along. They took the draft,
they read the draft and their initial response was, "This is great,
but Meany will never accept it." Goldberg said, "Fine, then you
shouldn't have any qualms about voting for it." And, so they did.
Goldberg then went to lunch with George Meany, and said to him,
"George, if you want a lot of changes it won't work, you will just
play into the hands of those in the CIO who are unenthusiastic. If
you take it as is we're in business." Meany flipped through it,
literally, over lunch and said, "I'll take it," without any real
revisions. And so the AFL-CIO merger agreement was really
drafted by the CIO, by its lawyer.
The AFL-CIO today has its own perspective on this.
Sometimes when you call AFL-CIO headquarters in Washington
you encounter people with an AFL background. A friend of mine,
an academic called not too many years ago and got one of these
AFL sort of people. My friend had a question about the CIO
merger, and the person on the other end of the phone asked, "Oh
yes, when did they rejoin us?" That is an AFL perspective on
these issues, which is not an accurate reflection of what actually
happened.
In any event, Goldberg comes back from the lunch, meets
with Reuther and says, "Meany says yes, he'll take it." And
Reuther's response was, "You're kidding." Reuther had lots of
qualms about this, but, Goldberg said, "Don't worry, we'll make it
work." They went down to Miami on February 9, 1955 to meet
with the AFL leaders and seal the deal. And it seemed to be all
done and then a huge argument arose over one final issue, which
was what to call the new labor federation. You would think that
this would not be a major hurdle after all the others, but in fact
the AFL people wanted to retain their name. "Well," they said,
"it's the older name, it's the American Federation of Labor, that's
inclusive enough." Walter Reuther at this point made a difference,
he said, "We'll leave, the auto workers will walk out rather than
join something called the American Federation of Labor because
that would signal that it isn't a merger." You can imagine what
this convention was like, George Meany saying, "Oh come on, be
cooperative," and then a meandering discussion on the part of
union leaders in the room to try to combine elements of both
names, "the Congress of American Labor, COAL, doesn't that
sound good." None of it was going anywhere. Goldberg fmally
came up with the idea, he's again very practical and yet still
visionary. He pointed out to these people later in the year when
they were still arguing about this, "Well you know the two major
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newspapers in Washington, D.C. had just merged and they're
going to put both of the names, hyphenated, on the top of the
masthead. If they can do that, why can't the new labor federation
be called the AFL-CIO?" And, so among Arthur Goldberg's many
contributions is that he literally gave the American labor
movement its modern name; although of course I suspect that
most members of the AFL-CIO today are entirely unaware of it.
The other leaders said, "Well, it's not exactly music to our ears, but
it works."
Which brings me to its
And so the merger was on.
consequences. The AFL wing of the labor movement did make
some very important concessions. They accepted at least for a
while, the CIO challenge to do something about union corruption.
Shortly after the merger the Teamsters union, as I'll go on to talk
about in a bit later, was expelled. The AFL wing also accepted to
CIO's preference for a close relationship with the Democratic
Party rather than a more opportunistic position of neutrality that
many in the AFL had long favored. To those of us today it seems
natural that the President of the AFL-CIO would speak at the
Democratic National Convention as he did here in Chicago in 1996
but not attend the Republican one. That's a CIO innovation that
has stuck. The AFL wing also agreed to support civil rights
legislation in the 1960's and AFL-CIO support was crucial when
passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965, although most people today would not be aware of that fact.
In other respects, however, the AFL position prevailed in the
short to medium run. Still unclear, however, is whether that will
be true in the fullness of time. It was Goldberg's hope that over
the long run both sides would move toward a moderate, middle
position. And as of today it is still impossible to be certain whether
his hope will ultimately be realized. Although historians don't
make predictions (that's the province of the political scientist), I'll
make one: I think in the fullness of time Goldberg is more likely to
be right than anyone else on this issue.
Which brings me to Goldberg's fourth major legacy, a related
one to the American labor movement, his fight against corruption
within it. And again this is a long and tangled story. I cannot
retell it completely here today but there are a few key points I'd
like to make about Goldberg's particular contributions in this area.
First, he responded much more constructively to this problem than
did many other AFL-CIO leaders. When labor corruption first
became a major public issue in the late 1950's, anti-labor
conservatives tried hard to use it to weaken unions in a variety of
ways. And many union leaders understandably responded in a
very defensive and even confrontational way, saying that the
investigations into labor corruption that Congress was conducting
were politically motivated and unfair, which to a degree they were.
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Goldberg, however, focused on the underlying problem behind the
investigation. In other words, to him it didn't really matter who
was saying there was corruption in the labor movement, if the
charge was actually true. And if it was, the union movement, he
firmly believed had an obligation to its members and to society at
large to do something about that situation. And he's a very
unusual figure at the top of the union movement in that regard. In
other words, there were others who agreed, but he was the most
forceful and open. And that was actually a very controversial
position for him to take. And so while some union leaders fought
the investigations, rejected the notion of outside accountability in
this area and so on, Goldberg cooperated with the investigations
and endorsed the idea that the AFL-CIO had an obligation to
reform itself. He headed a three-member Ethical Practices
Committee that did a couple of very important things. First, it
devised a set of rules, an ethical practices code to live by. They
were not new rules. It isn't as if the American labor movement
had functioned in a moral vacuum before, but they were not
written down at the time and therefore they were harder to
enforce against those who broke them. In addition to drafting this
Ethical Practices Code, he and the other members of the Ethical
Practices Committee recommended in the fall of 1957 the
expulsion of the Teamsters, then the largest AFL-CIO union, the
Bakers and the Laundry Workers from the AFL-CIO, and
recommended placing several other unions on probation or
suspension pending internal reform.
This was a courageous move in a variety of ways. The AFLCIO general convention adopted those recommendations and once
again here is where Arthur Goldberg made a difference. Meany's
support was crucial and at first Meany said to Goldberg, "I don't
like corruption, I have never liked corruption, but I don't think I
have the power as President to go along with ouster." Goldberg
said that George Meany was not a lawyer, but he was very
interested in law and legal concepts, and he had by the end of his
career an astonishing knowledge of law for someone who had
never been to law school. And in part that comes from the
building trades environment Meany grew up in, policing work
sites, learning rules of behavior. In any event, Goldberg sat him
down and gave Meany a little tutorial (and he was a truly gifted
teacher) about what it meant to be a legitimate labor union in the
AFL-CIO. In other words, Goldberg took the position that if you
were fundamentally engaged in corruption, that you were not a
legitimate labor organization in the meaning of the AFL-CIO
Constitution, and could be expelled on that basis. And Goldberg
convinced Meany to do so, to support this, which he did.
Even harder to do, Goldberg managed to persuade George
Meany to go along, almost kicking and screaming, with supporting
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some kind of anti-corruption legislation in Congress that would
put the power of law behind this notion that there were certain
things union people shouldn't do. And Arthur Goldberg was a
wonderful advocate as well as draftsman and counselor. I think he
must have used every argument in the book to get George Meany
to go along, both practical and principled. Somehow he managed
to do it. And while the ultimate result of the legislation was not
wholly satisfactory even to Goldberg, it did work to diminish
corruption in the union movement. In other words if that law, the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, were not on the books, there would
have been more.
Even so, there were problems with the overall result. The
investigations and labor's admissions of wrongdoing in some
instances helped diminish public confidence in the union
movement. And again I'm one of Arthur Goldberg's grandchildren
as it were and for my generation the notion that most labor people
are honest, which is true, is not as well understood because the
image that people have received in the media is that the
exceptional corrupt union chief is in fact somehow typical, which is
not true at all. And again, when you admit there's a problem and
you try to do something about it, this is one of the consequences
that can ensue.
Second, the expulsions from the AFL-CIO were so
controversial within labor that the Ethical Practices Committee
soon became dormant. In part that was because the expulsion
remedy soon demonstrated its limitations. The Teamsters in
particular once kicked out continued to thrive, to add new
members and so on, which made it harder to argue that expulsion
was an effective remedy, at least against big unions. And that
result greatly diminished the ability of Goldberg and others to use
the threat of expulsion as a lever for reform. As a consequence,
the AFL-CIO by the early 1960's was beginning to move back
toward the traditional AFL position of urging and allowing union
affiliates, individual unions, to deal with this problem themselves
to the best of their ability. And during the 1980's this rationale
that expulsion is not effective and so forth was even used to justify
the readmission of those unions expelled in 1957. And I don't
know-I guess it was Peter Edelman who mentioned the Arthur
Goldberg phone calls, or maybe it was Judge Shadur-I used to get
these when I was working on the book. And on the day it was
reported that the Teamsters union was going to be allowed back
in, I got a call from Goldberg. I was a graduate student, he never
used a title for me, I must have been one of the very few people he
dealt with in the 1980's who didn't have some kind of a title.
"David," he said,-he clearly was very upset and he wanted to talk
about it, and this was a reminder of how much-he hadn't been in
the union movement for years, he had many other things that he
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was dealing with-how concerned he was about that issue of
corruption. And they're all back in now, I believe, all of the unions
that were expelled.
This entire episode also had one other discouraging
consequence. It severely strained Goldberg's working relationship
with many key labor leaders, most notably George Meany. And so
by the end of this episode by 1960, Goldberg's ability to continue to
influence the direction of the union movement had begun to wane.
Despite that situation, Goldberg was able to make one final, major
contribution in 1960 to the union movement. He managed to bring
about enough labor support for John F. Kennedy's presidential
campaign as to make it successful.
And you know I teach undergraduates in large numbers at
Ohio State and these students, having grown up in the 80's and
the 90's, tend to view John F. Kennedy's victory in 1960 as
somehow inevitable or highly likely. And again, historians like to
remind people of the other possibilities and there were many
other possibilities, or at least one other possibility in 1960 that
was in some ways more likely but did not take place. And again,
this is a long and complicated story which I cannot tell in full here,
but there are a couple of key points I wish to emphasize, exactly
three in number.
First, Goldberg served as Kennedy's unofficial tutor during
the late 1950's in the area of labor affairs. This was a very
And Goldberg was, as noted earlier, an
important job.
extraordinarily gifted teacher. You probably only have to know
Arthur Goldberg for about an hour before he had taught you
something important, if that. During 1959 especially the two men,
Kennedy and Goldberg, spent long sessions in Goldberg's law office
during which Goldberg explained a great deal about unions, the
labor movement, its history and role within the economy and
politics of America. He helped prepare Senator Kennedy to be
President Kennedy.
Second, Goldberg stopped a movement within the AFL-CIO to
condemn Kennedy's presidential candidacy in the spring of 1960.
In other words Kennedy, as Senator, had played an important part
in drafting and working for anti-corruption legislation. And the
building trades union, some of them in particular, were deeply
angry about this. And what they wanted to do was issue a public
statement on the part of the AFL-CIO essentially vetoing
Kennedy's nomination. And in 1960 if the labor movement said
you were no good, and you were a Democratic presidential
candidate, you were finished. The world has changed somewhat,
but not entirely, since that time. And what this led to was a very
stormy session of the AFL-CIO executive counsel in February,
1960. And Goldberg, as he had in earlier struggles, managed to
prevail, to prevent this kind of labor veto by persuading George
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Meany to side with him.
Third, finally and most important, Goldberg persuaded
Meany and the other union chiefs to go all out for Kennedy in the
fall of 1960, something else that was not preordained. Unlike
Goldberg, Meany and some of the other AFL-CIO chiefs were very
dubious about Kennedy's prospects for winning the 1960
presidential election. And I could give you a list of reasons why
Kennedy was still something of a long shot, but I assume this
audience knows: his youth, his Catholicism, and so on.
And so these other AFL-CIO chiefs who were dubious about
Kennedy's prospects for winning quietly said among themselves
that to make the maximum effort against Richard Nixon who
seemed likely to win, struck them as foolhardy. In other words,
Nixon had started out as a rabidly anti-labor congressman but had
moderated his views somewhat during Eisenhower's presidency.
"Why run the risk of provoking Nixon's almost legendary
vindictiveness by going all out in what would likely be a losing
effort to defeat him?" some AFL-CIO leaders said. And Goldberg
strongly disagreed. He believed that an all out effort by labor in
1960 could carry Kennedy to victory and that labor stood to gain
substantially from such a result. And once again his counsel
carried the day both with George Meany and enough of the other
union leaders to bring about that result.
Although keep in mind of course it was breathtakingly close.
It was another example of Goldberg, the visionary. To truly
believe early in 1960 that Kennedy could win was a visionary
position. I once had a conversation with Ted Sorensen about this
and I said, "When it comes to Kennedy's supporters in 1960 what's
the key distinction?" Sorensen replied, "Were you for him before
Wisconsin?" In other words, the number of people who were for
Kennedy before he won his first major primary was relatively
small.
Now there were some drawbacks to this outcome, Kennedy's
victory, for labor. Labor's efforts led directly to an electoral result
in 1960 that greatly embittered Richard Nixon. When he finally
became president eight years later Nixon was less moderate and
restrained than he would have been had labor not helped defeat
Labor's efforts on Kennedy's behalf also
him in 1960.
strengthened the most anti-union forces within the Republican
Party, which veered sharply to the right after Nixon's defeat that
year. Even so Goldberg seems to have been right in believing that
putting the Democrats back in charge during the 60's would better
serve labor's interests. The late 50's and early 60's were an
unusual time in American history, one in which the American
people really came to a crossroads. And what has been lost,
especially among younger people such as myself, is an
understanding of how close the country came then to taking a
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more conservative road in the 1960's, one that would have hurt
labor in important ways. It's not clear to me, to give only one
example, that we would have had a huge explosion in public
employee unionism in the 1960's and early 1970's if the Democrats
had not come back to power during that decade.
Try to imagine what the AFL-CIO would look like today if it
didn't have many public employee members and you'll get some
sense of what I'm talking about. And so in retrospect Goldberg's
last major contribution as a top union official may have been his
most important of them all. Which brings me to the end of this
paper and I'm sure you're all relieved to hear that. Listening to
someone reading is not easy for most audiences, but Goldberg did
so many things that if I don't organize my notes in this way it's
almost impossible to keep them all straight. I do have two more
points that I'd like to make about his legacies to the American
labor movement.
First, his work reminds us how a single individual if he or she
be gifted, determined and courageous enough can make a real
difference in the life of a social movement and a society. Arthur
Goldberg did enough to be five or ten people but he was in fact just
one human being. Even though many people then and now were
largely unaware of just how influential he was, Arthur Goldberg
was fond of quoting a remark, he always attributed to John L.
Lewis that is instructive in this regard, "He who does not tooteth
his own horn, his horn shall not be tooted."
And this brings me to my second and final point, Goldberg
did not toot his own horn during his heyday as labor's
plenipotentiary. But those of us here today need to do so, to make
certain that he gets the credit, for all of his many
accomplishments, that he truly deserves. Thank you all. And if
you have questions I'd love to hear them. Questions anyone?
Thank you, you've been merciful. If you want to talk to me
privately afterwards I'd also be happy to do that.
Professor Gerald Berendt: Again, I strongly recommend those
of you who are interested in Arthur Goldberg if you have not read
Doctor Stebenne's book to definitely pick it up. As a matter of fact,
we have boosted your sales by purchasing a whole bunch of them
which we are going to prevail upon you to sign for us and we're
going to give to all of our guest speakers today.
Our second speaker on this part of the program is an old, old
friend of mine. When I first got into Illinois labor relations one of
my mentors, as a matter of fact a couple of my mentors, one of
them is sitting here, Art Malinowski, suggested that I meet the
named partners in the law firm of Cornfield and Fellman, both of
whom are sitting in front of us. Gil Cornfield is a fixture in the
Chicago labor relations community where he has practiced law on
behalf of a wide range of labor relations, labor organization
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including the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
employees and the Illinois Federation of Teachers.
He's a
graduate of the University of Chicago Law School. He's a member,
of course, of the law firm bearing his name, Cornfield and
Fellman. A firm which incidentally evolved out of one of the early
incarnations of the Goldberg law firm, Goldberg, Devoe and
Brussell. Mr. Cornfield is, in my opinion, that rare combination of
a successful practitioner and a thoughtful academic. And he is
frequently summoned by law professors and industrial relations
professors throughout this city and throughout this region to help
them put together programs to serve as a guest lecturer and so
forth. It's with great pleasure that I introduce Gil Cornfield.
Gil Cornfield: Thanks Jerry. I have prepared notes, not a
prepared speech. We've heard from spiritual brothers, children
and grandchildren of Arthur Goldberg. I guess I'm a spiritual
nephew twice removed. I came on the scene in 1958 at the point
that Abraham Brussell had established his own labor law firm.
You heard Milt Shadur describe the Goldberg law firm at one
point as Goldberg, Devoe and Brussell. I became an associate of
Abe Brussell in 1958 through the intervention of Ab Mikva, who
was still with what we then called the old firm. Brussell had been
in the OSS with Goldberg. I never did know if they knew each
other before the war or not. But, in any event, Brussell and
Goldberg shared their OSS experience.
As we've heard, in 1948-49, Goldberg left for Washington
become General Counsel to the CIO and the Steelworkers. The
firm continued by long distance between Chicago and Washington
for a period of time. Sometime in the 50's, Brussell divided from
the old firm and basically took the core of the regional labor
business with him. So when I came on the scene, Brussell was
General Counsel to the District of the Steelworkers and to locals of
the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union in the greater
Chicago area. That constituted the core of the practice. When
Milt Shadur described the amount of money they were making in
the 40's, I was actually astounded it was that much. We relied
mostly on fees from workers compensation cases to support the
representation of the labor organizations.
By 1958, industrial unionism had become an established part
of the national life. A situation quite different than the time that
Goldberg had become involved as a movement lawyer with the
Newspaper Guild and the Steelworkers in the 1930's. In those
days the organization was called the Steelworkers Organizing
Committee. When I come on the scene the communist element in
the old CIO and Steelworkers had been eliminated. The CIO had
already gone through internal strife over those issues. It was
shortly after the McCarthy experience in the country and the
McClellan Hearings which ultimately led to the Landrum-Griffin
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Act. So that was the scene. It was a transitional period between
the social movement led by the CIO of the 30's and 40's and the
post-Landrum-Griffin period of labor movement.
Brussell had also been General Counsel of the CIO in Illinois.
By 1958 the AFL and CIO had merged in Illinois. He was CoGeneral Counsel with Les Asher, who had been the General
Counsel of the AFL in Illinois.
Interestingly enough in my
conversations with Brussell over the years, I learned that he had
not been an advocate of the merger and he and Arthur Goldberg
had disagreed over the matter. Brussell was not a political
ideologue; but probably was more ideologically based than Arthur
Goldberg. In any event, Brussell represented the viewpoint that
the merger of the AFL and CIO would destroy or effectively vitiate
the CIO as a social movement.
The late 50's was just before the advent of the "Rust Belt," the
movement of industry in the north to the south, overseas,
combined with the dramatic increase in automation and
computerization.
In 1958, this District of the Steelworkers represented by our
firm was made up of 150,000 members within northern Illinois
and northwest Indiana. It was larger than the top 50% of the
international unions constituting the AFL and CIO. In 1958, the
Civil Rights Movement was just in its early stages. I think the bus
boycotts were beginning but the major thrust of the Civil Rights
Movement in the South had not yet come about. This is also prior
to the tremendous domestic conflicts attendant to the Viet Nam
War that we heard about earlier in our program. It was also just
prior to the resurgence of an anti-labor ethic in this country.
When I started practicing labor law, collective bargaining and
unionization were part of the American way of life. Employers
would generally not openly oppose the idea of unionization,
collective bargaining. It was accepted. It was some time in the
60's, I can't recall exactly when, it wasn't too long after I started to
practice that this ethos abruptly changed. A moral high ground of
expressed hostility to collective bargaining began to be claimed by
the management labor community. They no longer ceded to labor
the morale imperative. The whole scene began to dramatically
change.
The year of 1958 was also prior to the rise of the public
employee labor movement.
Interestingly, our firm's role in
supporting this new movement was, and continues to be a vital
part of our role as labor attorneys.
For those of us that are of the succeeding generation of labor
lawyers, Goldberg stands as a model of the union labor lawyer-a
special occupation I believe almost unique to the American society
and culture-for a variety of reasons. I'll just indicate some of
these to you. Goldberg came out of the west side of Chicago at a
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time when the industrial union movement was beginning to
emerge, reaching its momentum in the 1930's. There is a nexus
between Goldberg as a member of the second generation of Jewish
immigrants and the emergence of this new social movement. This
connection between people like Goldberg and the labor movement
was peculiar to American society because people like Goldberg
represented in some way the link between the workers and a
broader, liberal community; between the "intellectual" with higher
education degrees and the leaders of the labor movement of the
depression years. The labor lawyer during that time was a
product of the American experience. In western Europe labor
unions generally developed along with political parties and were
part of a broader political and social community. Those of us that
have been labor lawyers in the United States still carry to a great
extent that kind of particularized role established by Goldberg
with respect to elements of organized labor which still bear the
character of a broad based movement.
I listened to Milt Shadur's account of starting to practice as
an associate of three lawyers on LaSalle Street. Can you image
today the Editor-in-Chief of the University of Chicago Law Review
going to work for a three-person law firm in Chicago? But,
Goldberg's and Shadur's starts in the profession were not
uncharacteristic of a new Jewish attorney in the years preceding
and after World War II, whether or not they were outstanding
graduates from prestigious law schools. I remember some years
ago, on behalf of the Illinois Humanities Counsel, I participated
and assisted in a program on the relationship of the Jewish labor
lawyer to the labor movement. I interviewed Les Asher, Joe
Jacobs and others who were from an older generation and in many
cases these people became involved in labor movement partially
because they had become professionals and there weren't other
positions available to them. They did not even consider the
possibility of working for the large LaSalle Street law firms. So, it
was a very natural relationship that occurred between young
attorneys like Goldberg and the labor movement when he became
a professional. Thus, in a certain sense, my class of labor lawyers
bridged the ending of an era as it was being transformed into
another.
I'd like to discuss a little bit the institutional legacy of Arthur
Goldberg beyond the personal professional connection.
In
particular, in noting Gerry Berendt's program for this afternoon,
the merger of the CIO and the AFL; and, what I will call, from
competition to cooperation. As it turned out, it is my view the
merger was inevitable. I think the timing of the merger favored
the CIO. The CIO based upon a substantial membership founded
upon industrial mass unionization. If the merger had taken place
ten years later, those same industrial unions would have
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witnessed a tremendous and dramatic loss in membership. As it
turned out, therefore, Goldberg's timing was very, very meaningful
in maximizing the CIO's impact upon the merged relationship.
The merger was inevitable, in any event, because of the
general decline in union membership in the private sector, and
particularly industrial unions. As we've seen, since the merger
there's been continuation of mergers of international unions,
including the mergers of CIO and AFL internationals. So the
whole process was inevitable. The timing of the merger to a great
extent was because of particular efforts of Arthur Goldberg.
What about the effects of that merger on the American
political life? As we look back in hindsight now, the fact that the
AFL-CIO has existed rather than the CIO and the AFL, as
separate organizations, was and remains a counterbalance to the
politically conservative forces that have reached out to the white
blue-collar craft and skilled workers. We can recall the Nixon
hard hat appeal in enlisting support for the Viet Nam War and in
reaction to the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement. This era
began a continuous political effort to separate the white craft and
skilled workers from the Democratic Party and other workers.
What if the AFL and the CIO had remained separated? The CIO
would have been much more identified with the Civil Rights
Movement than probably the AFL because of the latter's craft and
skill based workers. Under those circumstances, the efforts of
conservative political forces to move labor out from its association
with the Democratic Party and into the Republican Party and
other conservative political organizations would have been even
more forceful. The Reagan Democrats continued the same appeal
that started during the Nixon period to divide the white worker
from the labor movement along with the dominance of the
Republican Party in the South.
On the other hand, the merger of the AFL and CIO, as Dave
has pointed out, put the labor movement and its leadership in a
supportive role the movement for civil rights. The AFL-CIO
leadership's support of civil rights has also encouraged
conservative political forces to drive a wedge between the white
membership of labor unions from their leadership. We still see
that phenomenon reverberating today. I don't know how many
with where
involved
I've been
campaigns
organizing
management's appeal is to isolate the white worker from the
expressed leadership positions of the AFL-CIO. I point this out to
demonstrate that the legacy of the merger is still unfolding in
terms of American political life and social life.
How about on the structure of labor organizations
The merger of the AFL-CIO reinforced the
themselves?
The CIO was a mass
centralization of union structures.
industrial-wide social movement. Local craft unions were, in
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many ways, like the old Democratic Party in Chicago, a system of
baronies based upon territories and ethnicity. The barons had,
and still have, a lot of authority, although their constituencies are
less defined and predictable. The nature of the construction
industry in which the crafts are employed is not as centralized as
compared to the CIO and industrial union movement. However,
the merger of the AFL-CIO was a thrust towards greater
centralization of authority and leadership within the labor
movement.
The merger was also was in response to an increase role of
the federal government in the internal operations of labor
organizations.
We can consider the centralization of labor
movement not only in terms of its impact upon labor; but upon the
political process of our society. It has been my strongly held view
that labor and labor organizations are the only significant, viable,
democratically based institution in American life in which there is
significant participation by the constituency served by the
organization. It's not ideal but it's the only one we have that's
significant. I don't view the political parties in this country as
being fundamentally organizations that involve a great deal of
mass participation in the electoral process.
Therefore, the
centralization of labor organizations that was reinforced by the
merger raises interesting kinds of questions which are significant
both in terms of labor organizations, as such and in the broader
American society. The period of Arthur Goldberg as a labor lawyer
was a time of social movement and he was a movement lawyer.
He became involved as part of a social movement. 'That
participation evolved into a professional specialty.
A social movement generally has leaders and rank and file. I
started thinking about the concept of the rank and file. What does
it mean to be a rank and file? It means that they are the base
upon which an organization moves. The term has a kind of
military quality to it. A leader goes to the rank and file to support
a program. A leader speaks for the rank and file, etc. There is a
difference between a social movement based upon the rank and file
and democratic organizations which arise from the grass roots and
whose leaders are representatives of the grass roots. I think the
test for labor and part of the legacy of Arthur Goldberg is whether
labor unions, now highly centralized within the American society,
can move significantly from organizations based upon a mass
constituency of the rank and file to organizations which grow and
are continually nourished by active involvement and direction
from the grass roots. I don't know. But, the spirit of democracy is
and must be part of our core part of our legacy.
Thank you.
Voice: I missed the first half hour of the seminar but no
speaker so far has mentioned or referred to the role of the
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National Lawyers Guild. That fine organization which was the
nexus between the law practice and the labor movement and other
movements of that kind. Is there some reason why no one has
mentioned it?
Gil Cornfield: If you read Dave's book, my recollection is he
mentions it. He mentions it particularly in the context of the late
30's, as I recall, in connection with the Newspaper Guild. By the
time people like myself come on the scene, the Lawyers Guild had
been the target of McCarthyism and had already been heavily redbaited if you want to call it that. Subsequently, in years gone by,
the Guild has had a renaissance. But I think the significance of
the Guild in our meeting today relates to the pre-war in which the
Guild was an important factor as a vehicle for movement lawyers
to become involved with the embryonic mass labor movement.
Voice: Will we ever in our lifetime see another Arthur
Goldberg?
Gil Cornfield: The way I see it is, there's a point in history in
which someone like Goldberg connects with a large scale social
movement and brings to that social movement intellectual and
professional skills. One gets that kind of merger from time to time
without a mass social movement; but I don't see that occurring.
There are going to be bright people, there's going to be idealistic
So the more
people, etc., but not that kind of connection.
fundamental question I think is, is society going to have another
social movement of the order of the industrial union movement
that came from the depression.
.If Arthur Goldberg had come on the scene when I did, as a
bright, capable, I don't think he would have become the Arthur
Goldberg of history because there wouldn't have been a social
movement that he would have connected with as the industrial
union movement. For example, Thurgood Marshall is a respected
But his association with the Civil
African-American lawyer.
Rights Movement created his place in history.
Voice: You raised a couple of points that I need some
clarification on just to understand. One was relative to the
separation. Apparently, there are efforts by management for
whatever reason to separate, you said, the whites from the union
leadership.
Gil Cornfield: Oh yes, that goes on still.
Voice: Can you elaborate a little bit on that?
Gil Cornfield: I think it was Dave that mentioned about the
AFL-CIO and its relationship to the Civil Rights Movement and
period of civil rights legislation and the organization's strong
support for that. That's true. And so you had George Meany
advocating it as the AFL. Even the AFL-CIO spokesperson for the
crafts, Gerogine, was a strong advocate of the legislative agenda.
There were political forces, and I believe there are still political
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forces in society, that use those positions articulated by the AFLCIO as ways of attempting to divide the white worker (usually
male) from identification with the labor movement on the basis
that the labor movement stands for these kinds of things but
they're not to your interest. Now it's not always said openly but
there are strong sub-textual messages that are made.
Voice: My second point was, I guess you had characterized the
democratic majority or in terms of the aspect of the democratic
organization that was always there, you said was the labor
movement. I agree with your characterization to the extent that
they at least typically and conventionally supported the
Democratic Party. I think maybe that's to the exclusion of,
particularly the Civil Rights community that was out there. For
instance, the African-American clergy in America has been since
Blacks turned democrat conventionally a significant part and a
constant supporter of democratic office particularly relative to the
Kennedy election and some of the forces that in America have
come to bear relative to Kennedy even being elected with support
of the African American and the black clergy. So I didn't want to
exclude that.
Gil Cornfield: Oh no, don't get me wrong I wasn't saying that
labor movement represented the only significant element of the
Democratic Party. I was only dealing with the labor movement's
relationship to the Democratic Party.
Voice: I don't know, this is probably opening a can of worms
but it seems to me that you haven't mentioned the Right to Work
Clause.
Gil Cornfield: There are a thousand things I could have
mentioned. As far as I am aware once Taft-Hartley was passed,
including the Right to Work legislation, labor has been totally
unsuccessful in changing any of those amendments. There were
efforts, but politically, labor has been impotent to do it. But that
ties in the right to work legislation with the Russ Belt, the
movement of the industry to the South. During my early years,
our early years in representing the Steelworkers in this area in
the 60's into the 70's, an awful lot of my time was spent dealing
with issues of plant removals, with whether the workers could
follow work to the South, negotiating over the effects of job loss,
etc. There were wildcat strikes over the removals. That really
characterized much of our experience in the 60's and 70's in terms
of industry in our area.
I think by the way of hindsight, it would be my view that in
the debate that may have taken place between Goldberg and
Brussell on the question of the merger or not, Goldberg was
probably more accurate. That is that the bringing in the CIO as a
social movement into a fundamentally craft organization had a
positive impact upon organized labor as our institution within the
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changing social and economic character of our society.
Professor Gerald Berendt: The next portion of our program is
devoted to Justice Arthur Goldberg's services an Associate Justice
on the United States Supreme Court and we're delighted to have
with us a gentleman who was introduced earlier in the program
during the reminiscence part of the program and that is Peter
Edelman, Professor of Law at Georgetown Law School. And we
have already pointed out to you that among his many credentials
he was clerk to Justice Goldberg from 1962 to 1963. It's my
pleasure to introduce Peter Edelman.
Professor Peter Edelman: Thank you Jerry. I didn't have a
chance to say earlier in our informal format how delighted I am to
be here and how delighted I am that you're having this conference.
I think it's so important and I think Justice Goldberg has not been
remembered enough in a formal way. So many of us have such
warm personal memories so it's very special for me to be here.
I'm not going to talk about labor law. There are others here
who are much more expert at that and you're going to hear about
that from them. I would like to talk a little bit more broadly about
Justice Goldberg's work on the Supreme Court. There is a definite
connection to everything that you've heard in terms of his
creativity and the way in which he would always find a way to see
things in a slightly different way. The time on the Supreme Court
was similar. He made a remarkable contribution in the three
short years that he served. It is important to remember that the
fall of 1962 was when the real Warren Court began. Even though
we think of the Warren Court going back to Brown v. Board of
Education and the Chief Justice's appointment by President
Eisenhower, that was the first time there was a reliable five vote
majority on the liberal side. There was Brown, there was Baker v.
Carr, and there were other important decisions, but the more
consistent stream of progressive decisions began when Justice
Goldberg replaced Justice Frankfurter and then continued when
Justice Fortas replaced Justice Goldberg.
There is some irony in this. Robert Kennedy once told me
that he and President Kennedy had expected Byron White to be
the liberal and that Arthur Goldberg would be the more
conservative. White was their New Frontier pal. Goldberg, while
also their close colleague, had stood up to the trade unions during
his time as Secretary of Labor and had created an impression that
he might continue to go somewhat against the grain on the Court.
He quickly proved to be an innovative force and leader on the
Court. He was immediately an activist. I saw that coming on as a
law clerk that first Term. He was an activist inside the Court
working very effectively to stitch together majorities and find
common ground in complex cases. He had an intuitive quality of
genius at being able to see how a glimmer in one colleague's view

The John MarshallLaw Review

[32:667

could be added to a hint in another's position to bring them
together. Of course that came from all those years in the labor
movement and all that negotiation experience, so that the
advertised talent for bringing parties together was entirely
truthful.
His jurisprudence was what I call creative plain meaning. He
was not a textual deviate, he believed in text, he wanted to ground
himself in the Constitution but he was definitely creative. And I
want to give you just four or five examples depending on how
much time we have.
The opinion of which he was probably the proudest was not a
majority opinion.
It was his concurrence in Griswold v.
Connecticut in 1965. There is a handful of opinions that he was
very proud of but that was certainly one of them. There was a
Connecticut law that prohibited the use of any drug, medicinal
article, or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception.
The case laid the groundwork for Roe v. Wade, which of course
remains controversial politically, but not just politically. It's also
doctrinally controversial as was Griswold. The question that we
still debate and that is still asked of nominees for the Supreme
Court in hearings in the Senate is, is there a notion of privacy
embedded in the Constitution and if so where does it come from?
Justice Goldberg invoked the little cited 9th Amendment in his
concurrence, which says, "The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."
I'll say more about his thinking in a minute, but I want to set
out a little context to set the stage for discussing how his creative
plain meaning approach operated here. The larger issue for
Goldberg and for the other liberals on the Court, Black and
Douglas, Warren and Brennan, was how to prevent governmental
overreaching into the lives of individual people without reviving
the idea of substantive due process that the Court had espoused in
Lochner v. New York in 1905. The newly emergent Roosevelt
Court thought that they had killed off Lochner and the liberals
wanted it to stay dead.
Lochner said that the state of New York could not regulate
the hours that bakers could bake, said that it interfered with the
liberty of bakery owners and employees to bargain with one
another over terms and conditions of work. Where is that right
found in the Constitution? The Supreme Court in 1905 said it was
found in the 14th Amendment which talks about a prohibition on
the States from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, a concept of economic due process. The
Court used that for over 30 years to strike down numerous state
efforts to regulate working conditions, create minimum wages, and
protect consumers, and at the same time engaged in a narrow
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reading of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce to
strike down numerous efforts by Congress to engage in similar
economic regulation. So it left for that period, for the first almost
40 years of the 20th century, a no man's land where no
government could reach and the market could operate unimpeded.
Social Darwinism.
When FDR finally captured the Court during his second term
the new majority was determined to end this situation. They
effectively overruled Lochner and the parallel commerce clause
cases and established the broad power of both the states and
Congress to engage in economic regulation. The Court really
didn't want to open up that door again. If you look at the cases
you see Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma in 1955 where
Oklahoma wouldn't allow opticians to even duplicate existing
lenses without a prescription from an ophthalmologist or an
optometrist.
The Court upheld the regulation.
It's clearly
political. The Court wouldn't touch it. There was a case called
Ferguson v. Skrupa in 1963, about a Kansas law that would not
allow people to do debt adjusting unless they were lawyers. You
can see how that law got passed. The Court said, "If you don't like
it, don't come to us, go to the legislature."
The Court was going a long way to stay away from re-opening
economic due process. There is a case right now that is going to
raise the issue again, which is about hair braiding in Ohio.
African American women who do hair braiding are required to
take a totally irrelevant cosmetology course, 1500 hours, or they
can't open a store to do hair braiding. Common sense says there's
something wrong with that law. But, there continues to be such a
reaction to Lochner - and rightly so-that the Court doesn't want
to open it up again.
There was another piece of Lochner that was more relevant to
the Griswold case itself, that actually had never been explicitly
overruled. Meyer v. Nebraska, a seven to two decision in 1923,
involved a state law prohibiting the teaching of modern languages
other than English in grammar schools. It had been enacted as
part of one of the periodic waves of nativism that we have in this
country. There was an eloquent opinion by Justice McReynolds.
He talked about the "right of the individual to contract, to engage
in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his conscience and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized that common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."
Holmes dissented, because of his opposition to economic due
process. Brandeis went along with the majority; the dissenters
were Holmes and Sutherland.
Two years later there was a case called Pierce v. Society of the
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Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary where Oregon had
prohibited sending children to private school. The Court struck
that down. Lochner, substantive due process.
The Griswold Court could have seized on those two cases.
The cases had never been overruled, but they didn't because they
were worried about reviving Lochner in the economics sphere, that
somebody would use their reasoning in Griswold to do that.
Douglas wrote the opinion for the majority. He cited Meyer
and Pierce; but, he interpreted them as First Amendment freedom
of association cases. He wrote a rather ridiculous opinion that
talked about "penumbras formed by emanations from those
guarantees that give them life and substance" to create the zones
of privacy. He mentions the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and the
Ninth Amendments as each having something to do with privacy.
Implicitly none is dispositive, so Justice Goldberg was
uncomfortable with Justice Douglas' formulation. He was also
uncomfortable with using Meyer and Pierce, although he did cite
them to buttress his formulation. The issue for Justice Goldberg
was finding the text to support his view that the Connecticut
statute was unconstitutional, but that would not open the door to
reawakening the economic side of Lochner. He found it in the
Ninth Amendment.
His own reasoning is not without twists and turns because he
didn't want to open the door to the wholesale use or misuse of the
open ended rather indeterminate language of the Ninth
Amendment. So he used the Ninth Amendment to buttress his
reading of the word liberty in the Fifth and the Fourteenth, and he
also joined the Court's opinion. But then he said that, "the concept
of liberty embraces the right of marital privacy even though that
right is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution." And he said
the case law supports that, but also that "the language and history
of the Ninth Amendment . . . reveal that the framers of the
Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental
rights, protected from governmental infringement" which exist
alongside those rights specifically mentioned in the first eight
Constitutional Amendments.
The following sentence is the heart of the opinion: "Surely the
Government, absent a showing of a compelling subordinating state
interest, could not decree that all husbands and wives must be
sterilized after two children had been born to them." This is
common sense. He is saying there must be something, and he is a
little reluctant to call it substantive due process, that limits
government from doing these absolutely outrageous things and he
finds it in the Ninth Amendment. He said personal rights are
"retained by the people" and "that the right of privacy and the
marital relation is fundamental and basic, a personal right
retained by the people within the meaning of the Ninth
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Amendment."
This is very interesting, kind of thin ice to be honest, but he's
juggling a number of important dilemmas. This issue is, how do
we limit the government from interfering in things that are so
basic; we know what's wrong but we don't have a handle. It's an
important problem in constitutional law.
We don't know what would have happened if he had stayed on
the Court. He had Chief justice Warren and Brennan with him in
the opinion, they concurred, there were three of them that joined
together in this. Would they have gotten two others as time
passed? Was it even a good idea? I personally believe that a
modern largely non-economic substantive due process can work,
that it's justified and that it doesn't unduly raise the specter of
reincarnation of Lochner. But Justice Goldberg's effort in
Griswold was very important.
Another case that he was very proud of was Escobedo which
he wrote in 1964, a five to four case, decided just a year after the
historic right to counsel case of Gideon v. Wainwright. The
question was about the right to counsel earlier in the process,
when before a trial it attaches. The decision laid the groundwork
for the Miranda Rule which the court adopted two years later. But
the difference is interesting. Justice Goldberg saw this as a right
to counsel issue, and if the implications of that had been followed
out to their logical conclusion, it very likely would have had far
reaching effects. Miranda says you have to be warned, that you
have a right to counsel but that you can waive it and that it's
based on the Fifth Amendment. It was very controversial for quite
a period of time but over the years the police and prosecutors have
figured out that it's really not a big impediment to successful
prosecution. The actual requirement of counsel-all of these
things can be manipulated, of course-but the actual requirement
of counsel with a presumably higher threshold for the validity of
the waiver could have worked out quite differently. Justice
Goldberg was very conscious of that and very proud of his
formulation. Again, he didn't stay and so we don't know what
would have happened if he had and had continued to push for it.
The opinion is an impressive piece of scholarship. He said, "It
would exalt form over substance to make the right to counsel,
under these circumstances, depend on whether at the time of the
interrogation the authorities had secured a formal indictment."
That shouldn't matter., He said the petitioner "had, for all
practical purposes, already been charged with murder." Exalting
form over substance, that's a phrase he liked a lot.
He cited English judges' use of functional rather than a
formal text., He contrasted the Soviet Criminal Code which does
not permit:.a lawyer to be present during interrogation, and
referred to,the proceedings of the 20th Congress of the Communist
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Party exposing false confessions obtained during Stalin's rule in
the 30's. And he quoted the venerable Professor Wigmore, well
known in these precincts, who said any system where prosecution
trusts habitually to compulsory self-disclosure "must itself suffer
morally thereby."
His dissent from the denial of certiorari in a case called
Rudolph v. Alabama in the fall of 1963 elaborated a contemporary
theory of cruel and unusual punishment and helped significantly
in paving the way toward the Court's capital punishment work a
few years later. The question in the case was the death penalty
imposed on a rapist who hadn't taken or endangered human life.
He was joined by Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan. It was a
very short opinion. He just asked three questions. One is in light
of the trend both in this country and throughout the world about
punishing rape by death, does the imposition of the death penalty
by those states that retain it for rape violate evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of our maturing society? Just a
question, but a penetrating and very important question. Two, is
the taking of human life to protect a value other than human life
consistent
with the Constitutional
proscription
against
punishments which by their excessive severity are greatly
disproportioned to the events as charged? And three, can the
permissible aims of punishment, e.g., deterrence, isolation, and
rehabilitation, be achieved as effectively by punishing rape less
severely than by death, e.g., by life imprisonment? If so does the
imposition of the death penalty for rape constitute unnecessary
cruelty? I just read you the entire opinion. He was very proud of
this. A tremendous effort went into thinking it through, getting it
just right, and boiling it down. It was very important to the
subsequent evolution of these issues in the Court.
Another case that the Justice often mentioned with pride was
decided the year I clerked. It was his opinion for the Court in
Watson v. City of Memphis. This was a case, otherwise routine by
1963, about the desegregation of the parks and recreation facilities
in Memphis. What was important about it is that Justice
Goldberg got the idea, and I remember this personally, that he
wanted to convince the brethren to take a strong stand that we
had to have desegregation right away, that the time for all
deliberate speed had passed. He obtained a nine to nothing
majority, which was his personal contribution here, as I recall. He
said that it had been nine years since Brown, and eight years since
the first case on public recreation facilities. Then came the key
language, since parks and recreation are a little less complicated
to desegregate than schools. He said on behalf of a unanimous
Court that, "given the extended time which has elapsed, it is far
from clear that the mandate of the second Brown decision
requiring that desegregation proceed with all deliberate speed
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would today be fully satisfied by types of plans or programs for
desegregation of public educational facilities which eight years ago
might have been deemed significant." That is of course dictum,
not necessary to the decision in the case, but he talked his
colleagues into saying that. It was especially important to send
the message around the country in 1963 that the Court
unanimously was getting impatient with the pace of school
desegregation.
You see in the span of these cases all the great issues of the
day. Every one of the issues that I've mentioned is of great
significance in our country. He wrote a concurrence in the Bible
reading case, School Dist. of Abington Tp,, Pa. V. Schempp, which
was also decided during my clerkship year. He was joined in the
opinion by Justice Harlan. His basic point was how complicated it
is to make the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause
both work, and to have them work together. He said, "Judgment
in each case is a delicate one." He pointed out that Bible reading
in school is a clear case. The state is utilizing its facilities to
engage in unmistakably religious exercises. But then he added
that, "the First Amendment does not prohibit practices which by
any realistic measure create none of the dangers which it is
designed to prevent and which do not so directly or substantially
involve the state in religious exercises or in the favoring of religion
as to have meaningful and practical impact." If that sounds like
too many words, he gave examples, saying military chaplains are
fine, and teaching about religion in school is fine.
I had many conversations with him over the years where he
was quite impatient with people who litigated about what he
regarded as small questions of the establishment of religion. I, of
course, don't know how he would have voted, but in the later years
when the Court has become more likely to say that something is
not sectarian or not an establishment of religion but really a
permissible accommodation, they have been going in the direction
he advocated. You may know the Witters case about a blind man
who wanted to have the state pay for his education in a religiously
I think Justice Goldberg would have
oriented institution.
approved of that, and of the move that we've had in recent years to
being more flexible in our view of all of this. He said, "Untutored
devotion to the concept of neutrality" can lead to "a passive or even
active hostility to the religious. A vast portion of our people
believe in and worship God and many of our legal, political and
personal values derived historically from religious teachings."
This was literally iconoclastic, and another case that he felt
strongly about.
It was a wonderful record of
I could go on and on.
accomplishment, an amazing accumulation in just three years. He
played an influential role on so many great issues of the day. It is
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sad, as I said earlier, that he resigned from the Court.
There is one other case that I want to mention. It was the
second opinion that he wrote. It was a case called Foman v. Davis.
A woman had sued because she thought she had a deal with her
father that if she took care of her mother, the father's first wife,
she would inherit intestate and she would be compensated in that
way. Then the second wife overreached and the father left all the
money to the second wife, and the daughter sued. It must have
been a diversity case. I won't take you through the details, but
essentially she was thrown out of court on a technicality. She
tried to appeal but she must not have had a very good lawyer. He
got the appeal wrong procedurally. There were two appeals. One
was thrown out as premature, and the second was thrown out as
appealing only from some post-judgment motions that she had
made. The Court of Appeals held that she had never properly
appealed the merits of the case.
Justice Goldberg picked that out of the pile. I remember that
so well. He had just been on the Court for only about a month. He
said, "This is terrible, we've got to do something about this." You
know the Supreme Court is supposed to be deciding cases like
Brown v. Board of Education and cases like the ones that I've
talked about today. He said, "We really have to see that Ms.
Foman gets her day in court." He convinced the brethren and it
came out almost unanimous. He wrote that "the Federal Rules
reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome."
It was vintage Goldberg.
It is so indicative of the
fundamental point about Arthur Goldberg as a Supreme Court
Justice. If there is a fault line between the jurisprudence of
technical proficiency and the jurisprudence of getting to the right
result, Arthur Goldberg was surely in the latter group, and Foman
v. Davis illustrates it so well.
He was an excellent lawyer and he was a diligent scholar.
When he developed a new theory or a new application of old
principles he did so with intellectual rigor. I've tried to illustrate
that. His three years on the Court were enormously productive.
Maybe because of the obscuring effect of the fact that he resigned
and went to the UN, I don't think that they're sufficiently
examined and appreciated. So I'm glad to have had a chance to do
that a little with you today. Thanks so much for the chance to be
here.
Professor Gerald Berendt: Our second speaker on this part of
the program about Justice Goldberg's service on the Supreme
Court is also an old friend of mine and that's Wesley Wildman of
the University of Chicago. In addition to teaching labor law and
industrial relations for many years at the Univeisity of Chicago,
Professor Wildman practices law representing management clients

1999]

Arthur J. Goldberg

and I understand he's one heck of a negotiator from the people on
the other side of the table who talk to me about him. He has
practiced with a number of noted Chicago area law firms, Robbins,
Schwartz & Lifton; Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz; and
most recently with Franczek Sullivan, P.C. Mr. Wildman has also
held several numbers or several important government posts. One
was an appointment by Governor Jim Thompson to the original,
the first Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, Wes joined
the board in 1984 in the original appointments.
He's published a number of scholarly articles on labor
relations law and has taught more successful arbitrators,
mediators and labor lawyers and negotiators than he would care to
admit. It's my pleasure to introduce Wes Wildman.
Wesley Wildman: Thank you very much Jerry. This is the
only instance today where the introduction will turn out to be
longer than the presentation.
In a very real sense Justice
Goldberg didn't leave much of a legacy in labor cases from his
three years on the Supreme Court and I am gratified to see the
Judge and the historian nodding approval here. I came to this
task at Jerry's request. I had my wife go to Nexus and pull down
every case in the world that said Goldberg and labor and there
were maybe 30, 35 of them and I dutifully plowed through them
all. The first thing that impressed, amazed me historically was
that the cases, the classic labor cases that we still teach, that
issued from the court during Goldberg's three years on the court..
Now one of the questions I would have asked, do we have any
of the clerks still here? We didn't get a chance to ask Peter this,
was, "How did Goldberg relate to and use his clerks?" But more
specifically can we assume that with his vast knowledge of
industrial relations and collective bargaining that despite the fact
(unless I missed a case) that he ever wrote a majority opinion in a
labor case, did he have an enormous impact in caucuses on these
cases. We don't know. He frequently recused on labor cases but
not necessarily in the landmark decisions.
What did I get reading the dissents? And there were a few of
them. And the concurrences? I made an attempt to get Stebenne's
book and read it before I appeared here today. I finally came up
with one after Jerry told me that I get a free copy for appearing
today.
But it's interesting that the image presented here today by
these very moving reminiscences and everything else that we've
heard from David and others fits what you see when you read the
relatively sparse output of Justice Goldberg in these labor cases
and the occasional dissent and concurrences. Patience. Gentility.
Collegiality., Pushing one notion above all others and I quote the
actualities of industrial relations, all right? He once said in one of
these concurrences to his Supreme Court Brethren, "We're crafting
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basic rules of national labor policy and we've got to do it carefully
and with a keen eye on what really goes on at the bargaining
table." And that is the role that played in all of these concurrences
and the occasional decent in these labor cases. Making some
refinements at the margin with regard to some of the rather too
sweeping pronouncements made by the majority, etc., but always,
again I say with patience, gentility, collegiality of a sort we don't
see much of today.
I didn't know what I would find with regard to bias given
Goldberg's background.
I can say no way was there ever
demonstrated in any of his decisions a reflexively pro-union
stance. In Brown, for instance, Goldberg defended a lock out in no
uncertain terms and the operation of the firm, the locked out firm,
with temporary replacements to counter whipsawing in a multi
employer bargaining unit. You always had the feeling whenever
he spoke on a labor case that here was someone who knew exactly
what was going on and he brooked no nonsense. In American
Shipbuilding, Goldberg defends the defensive lockout and even
hints at the possible legitimate broadening of the doctrine. At the
same time, American Shipbuilding refused to go along with the
sweeping rule of the majority. Just a word on this, the Supreme
Court had never said up until 1965 that if a union could strike
virtually any time they wanted to to put economic pressure on an
employer that it would be legitimate for an employer to go ahead
and lock out to put economic pressure on the union. That's
exactly, what the Supreme Court said in American Ship Building
in 1965. To paraphrase, the Court almost said to the National
Labor Relations Board, where did you ever get the idea that the
employers right to lock out isn't just exactly the counterpart of the
unions right to strike? Goldberg in his concurrence in that opinion
said, no question but that a defensive lock out is justifiable in this
case but you don't have to go beyond established doctrine about
defensive lockouts. You don't have to make this sweeping finding
he said to his brethren, that the lock out is in every meaningful
sense a counterpart to the strikes. What shines through in all of
these decisions where he did speak, is a concern for a careful
nurturing of an industrial relations system for which he obviously
held near reverence. This is completely in keeping what I found
with everything else of a personal nature that we have heard
today about Justice Goldberg.
And then, of course, the case of the century. In terms of
underlying policy considerations if not the practicalities of labor
relations, I think it would be tough for any of the labor lawyers
here today to say that Pennington had a big impact on the nature
and practice of collective bargaining in the United States
subsequent to 1965. But for intellectuals and professors and all
the rest who want to play with national policy considerations,
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there's no question that Pennington is the case of the century.
And I'll take just a minute to tell a non-labor lawyers here
what Pennington was all about. United Mine Worker sat down
with the big producers and said give us this, give us that, more
money, make the hospitalization plan better, etc. Big producers
said, this is the early 60's now, we can't. The Union asked, why
not? The big producers said, because the United Mine Workers no
longer represent all the people who mine coal in the United States
and the small producers, the strip mines and the burgeoning nonunion folks are eating us alive. The Union responded, don't worry
about it, we'll go out and we'll organize them, we'll strike them,
we'll picket them, we'll make them pay industry standards that
we're not asking you to yield on. Amazingly enough, the Supreme
Court of the United States said was a violation of the Sherman
Anti-trust Act. For once in a decision on the Supreme Court that I
read, (rightly so in my estimation) Goldberg went berserk. He
wrote his longest single decision in dissent (depending on what
version, how many words on a page you're reading it's anywhere
from 30 to 50 or 55 pages long) in which he says in effect, and I'm
paraphrasing, to the majority never quite loosing his cool and
getting nasty, what the hell do you think labor unions are for if not
to take wages out of competition. What do you think the ultimate
goal of a labor union is except to organize an entire relative labor
or product market and get a uniform rate which is higher than the
one that pertained before? That's the essence of his dissent. You
are just, he said to his majority brethren, dead wrong. Of course
he elaborated his decision.
I will finish by taking a look at Justice Goldberg's incredibly
famous and important dissent in Pennington from three points of
view. First, the law and the decision. Second, jurisprudential
posture, and third, can we get any kind of a clue into this man's
underlying economic, social and political philosophy with regard to
aggregates in a society, unions, and the use of union power. What
kind of presumptions does he work from?
Let's take first the question of the law and the decision. I've
already told you there's no question in my mind that he was
absolutely right that the Supreme Court was absolutely wrong.
Let me just read you two of the sentences. One states, "That is the
majority of the court that uniform wage agreements may be made
with multi employer units. But an agreement cannot be made to
affect employers outside the formal bargaining unit." And here
comes the classic Goldberg approach in labor cases in his three
years on the Supreme Court except it's a little more bluntly stated,
not a lot of the gentle nudging that he did in the other cases. "I
don't believe", he said, " that the court understands the effect of
it's ruling in terms of the practical realities of the automobile,
steel, rubber, ship building and numerous other industries which
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follow the policy of pattern collective bargaining." Pretty heavy
condemnation of the Supreme Court. He's saying you don't know
what the hell goes on in this country at bargaining tables. And he
was absolutely right.
What about so called jurisprudential posture? How did he
handle this case? What were his arguments? In this case, he
didn't say anything about the Ninth Amendment, at least up to a
point. Peter mentioned the famous Lochner case and the nonattorneys among you glaze over at this point in the afternoon-but
it was damned important. A question of whether the Supreme
Court should substitute its judgment for the judgment of the
states in essentially economic legislation. And Holmes dissented in
Lochner. The Lochner majority said to the State of New York, that
it was interfering with the right of bakers to work 16 hours a day
if they wanted to. The German immigrant bakers worked almost
around the clock in shops owned by folks who had come over
before they did. They would bake and then they would go to bed
for a while and then they'd get up and they'd deliver the baked
goods. And they were up against the traditional entrepreneurial
bakeshops where you just worked a shift. Holmes said the
Supreme Court had no right to substitute its judgment on bakers'
maximum hours for the judgment of the legislature of New York.
And his famous dissent was short, it's just a half a page. I'll read
just a sentence or two. "This case is decided upon an economic
theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. If it
were a question whether I agreed with that theory I should desire
to study it further and long before making up my mind. But I
don't conceive that to be my duty", said Holmes, "because I
strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing
to do with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law."
This has become the classic anti-Lochner position that Peter was
making reference to earlier.
"Some of these laws embody
convictions or prejudices which judges are likely to share, some
may not but a constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory whether of paternalism and the organic relation
of the citizen to the state." So Holmes said I'm going to keep my
hands off this stuff.
Justice Goldberg, in his dissent in Pennington, said, "My
conclusion that unions and employers are exempt from the
operations of the anti-trust laws for activities involving subjects of
mandatory bargaining is based solely on congressional statutes
which I believe clearly grant such an exemption and not on any
views past or present as to the economic desirability of such an
exemption. Whether it is wise or sound public policy for this
exemption of unions from the anti-trust laws to continue to exist in
it's present form or at all, or whether the exemption gives too
much power to labor organizations, it is solely for congress to
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determine." Very, very Holmesy, no question, almost a paraphrase
of Holmes' descent in the Lochner case.
In Peter's outline to you the ways in which, at least in a
handful of cases the Ninth Amendment was used by Goldberg to
get back a bit when he wanted to, to Lochner. It is the key
dilemma in constitutional law today. But that's what he said in
this famous dissent in Pennington. So, what does that mean?
We're not going to get any kind of a clue here as to the underlying
economic assumptions and predispositions of Justice Goldberg. He
was keeping his hands off questions of judgment. It's up to
Congress to make those judgments. Well, not quite. Holmes, case
after case, in dissent would say what he said in Lochner, it's none
of our business, let the labor union do what it wants to do unless
it's being violent and nasty.
But in taking these positions Holmes would sometimes
unburden himself just to let everybody know that he mightalthough he was being agnostic-that he knew what was going on
in the world. For instance in a Massachusetts case, Plant v
Woods, in 1900, Holmes in his dissent, said leave the labor union
alone. "This is not the place for extended economic discussion,"
Holmes once said, "although the law may not always reach
ultimate economic conceptions I think it well to add that I
cherish", this is his famous cherish no illusions paragraph, "no
illusions as to the meaning an effective strikes. Although I think
the strike a lawful instrument in the universal struggle of life, I
think it's pure fantasy to suppose that there is a body of capital
that which labor is a whole, secure as a larger share by that
means. The annual product subject to an infinite deduction for the
luxuries of the few is directed the consumption by the multitude
and is consumed by the multitude always. Organization and
strikes may get a larger share for the members of an organization,
but if they do they get it at the expense of the less organized and
less powerful portion of the laboring mass, they do not create
something out of nothing."
So Holmes, despite his consistently anti-Lochner posture
through his entire career on the bench would every once in a while
feel it necessary to disclose some of what he knew about the
economics and organizations and collective bargaining. Despite
the paragraph that I read you where Goldberg said it was up to
Congress to make those judgments, do we find Goldberg similarly
unburdening himself in giving us any clues at all to underlying
economic and social and political philosophy? We do and in a
rather dramatic fashion. You know the Clayton Act says, "The
labor of a human being is not a commodity or an article of
commerce." That sentence is cited six times in this one dissenting
opinion. And in addition to that he was fond of coming back again
and again to a quote from Justice Brandeis, "What public policy in
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regard to the industrial struggle demands is not for judges to
determine", etc.. So you begin to get a flavor of an economic
philosophy here which is incidentally a little different that what
you pick up from Holmes in Plant v Wood, although Holmes
contradicted himself in other cases with regard to the desirability
of strikes and what labor unions can accomplish.
I think the dissent is a classic and will go down in history as
absolutely right, there's no question about it. With regard to this
underlying economic and political and social philosophy, the most
charitably view would perhaps be styled as an incomplete view of a
considerably more complex world than Justice Goldberg was
willing to acknowledge. Here the other shoe drops in just two
paragraphs in this dissent. We get hints from the constant
invocation that labor is not a commodity but here it is. "The very
purpose and effect of a labor union is to limit the power of an
employer to use competition among working men to drive down
wage rates and enforce substandard conditions of employment."
His language. And again on the same page of the decision. "It is
clear that Congress did not intend that competition among
manufacturers should be carried on not on the basis of their
relative efficiency or ability to produce what the consumer
demands but on their ability to operate at substandard wage
rates." The only inference I can draw from these two statements
(and they're the only two statements of their kind in the
Penningtondissent) is that by in large for Goldberg, any wage rate
not set by a union engaged in collective bargaining is likely to be
substandard. As I said, I think that the most charitable view of
this is that the world is a bit more complex. After all in 1931 we
had Davis Bacon to go back to and look at the legislative history.
Incidentally, Davis Bacon is cited with approval in the Pennington
dissent. He realized it was sort of a shameful piece of legislation,
at least in terms of the motivation. Representative Bacon was
upset at the fact that a southern contractor was bringing black
labor up to North to compete against him in the building of
hospitals and other public institutions in that state, and a
southern senator and the legislative history apologizes for
bringing up bootleg, colored labor to compete in the North. You
have got to assume that Justice Goldberg was aware of this kind of
thing. In 1965, we had Greg Lewis' famous study on unionism and
relative wage rates, consensus among labor economist all the way
from Harvard to Chicago to the west coast that labor unions raise
the wage rates of their members, but they do it through the
operation of the labor monopoly. He must have been aware of
these kinds of things. By 1965, there were minimum wage studies
which notwithstanding show consistently that some people are
thrown out of work and they demonstrated many a classical model
to be maldistributionist and GNP is lower. So there's no hint of
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that here and I think the opinion would have been stronger if
Justice Goldberg had at least acknowledged in passing that there
is a hell of a problem in a society which says you're going to the
slammer if you violate the Sherman Anti Trust Act but we
encourage labor monopoly. Not saying it's an unjustifiable policy
position for a society to take but it does create tensions and it's
those tensions that gave rise to the majority opinion in
Pennington. The important thing here is that Goldberg got the
law right and he got the actualities right. And how often do we get
that these days. Thanks a lot for listening.
Dean Gilbert Johnston: The final speaker of the program
today is the Chair of the day. Jerry Berendt has been a member of
this faculty for 24 years. He came to us from Washington where
he served as counsel to a member of the National Labor Relations
Board. He's held a number of very important governmental
appointments in Illinois. And you know about it, he's a noted
author on collective bargaining and recently in contracts. I want
to personally say a few words as Chair of school's centennial
planning committee and I want to thank Jerry for taking the time
and applying his talents to plan and execute this superb program
today. I did not know Arthur Goldberg but I would expect that he
would have approved of this gathering today and would also
appreciate this very warm celebration of his life that Jerry has
created for us today. Thank you Jerry.
Professor Gerald Berendt: As we're running short on time I
wanted to take the opportunity to acknowledge the presence today
of two of the Goldberg relatives, Trudy and Charlotte Lenoff.
I met Arthur Goldberg once at a John Marshall
Commencement in 1986 or 1987. Goldberg was in the process at
the time of answering the obbligato question, "Why did you leave
the Supreme Court and how did Lyndon Johnson convince you to
do this?" And I waited patiently until he had answered. He
answered with great dignity and great patience, again, to a
question he must have answered a million times. And when he
was finished Len Shrager introduced me and we shook hands. He
didn't make eye contact and I was a little concerned about that
and I said, "Shrager introduced me as a labor law professor and,
well I'm not going to boar you with any of these questions about
Lyndon Johnson and the Supreme Court and the UN, I'm going to
ask you about your relationship with Roger Blough and the
Steelworkers dispute." And he turned and made eye contact with
me. And he said, "You know nobody asks me about that any more,
and I'm glad you did." He spent the next fifteen minutes talking
to me about it. I told that story to David Stebenne and David told
me that when he asked Arthur questions in the interviews that he
had with him about the Steelworkers situation and Roger Blough
that he became animated at that point also. And he and I linked
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up at that point.
Arthur Goldberg first met John Kennedy in 1948 when
Kennedy was a member of the House of Representatives.
Goldberg remembered later that Kennedy looked like a high school
graduate at the time he met him. They came to know each other
much better over time as Kennedy served on House and Senate
Labor Committees from 1947 till 1960. Following the McClellan
Committee hearings, Goldberg worked closely with Kennedy in
1958 and 1959 on Kennedy's ill-fated version of the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act which was designed to
amend Taft-Hartley and implement reforms in internal union
governance. Later when he ran for President, Kennedy enlisted
Goldberg's assistance in his efforts to obtain the Democratic
nomination. After consulting Adlai Stevenson who assured him he
would not enter the primaries, Goldberg surprised Stevenson and
labor leaders by declaring his support for Kennedy over Hubert
Humphrey who had a better record on behalf of workers' issues
and New Deal programs. Goldberg reasoned that Kennedy had
the best chance to win against the likely Republican nominee, Vice
President Richard Nixon, and that Kennedy offered the best
chance of progress against social, class and racial oppression.
Labor leaders were angry with Kennedy over his role in labor
reform legislation, and the AFL-CIO considered publicly
announcing its opposition to his candidacy.
However, after
Goldberg appeared at an AFL-CIO Executive Council meeting, a
motion to oppose Kennedy's candidacy failed. After the Wisconsin
and West Virginia primaries, Humphrey dropped out of the race,
leaving Lyndon Johnson whose only hope was for a brokered
convention. Since Johnson was anathema to the labor movement,
most of the labor movement lined up behind Kennedy with the
exception of the building trades. Although Adlai Stevenson
mounted a last minute "draft Stevenson" effort, Kennedy prevailed
and won the Democratic nomination at the Los Angeles
Convention.
Kennedy biographers report that Goldberg
participated in the discussions over whom Kennedy should choose
for his running mate. Goldberg preferred Humphrey, but Kennedy
chose Johnson to complete the ticket. In the November 1960
election, Goldberg's work cultivating the labor support paid off,
particularly in the tight Illinois race, and Johnson's place on the
ticket helped Kennedy carry Texas and hold enough of the
Southern states to prevail.
With the election over Goldberg anticipated appointment
within the Kennedy cabinet.
Due to his strong personal
commitment to civil rights and his dream of an appointment to the
Supreme Court, Goldberg's preference was -either Attorney
General or the number two position in the Justice Department.
But Kennedy had other plans for Justice and decided to tap
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Arthur for Secretary of Labor. In a gesture of deference, Kennedy
asked AFL-CIO head George Meany to send him a list of
candidates for Secretary of Labor, expecting Goldberg's name to be
on it. But Goldberg had picked up enemies in the labor movement,
particularly among the building trades leaders and those who
wanted a more traditional AFL person.
Goldberg was
understandably disturbed by Labor's initial failure to support his
appointment, but the President-elect smoothed over matters with
Meany.
Goldberg's appointment sailed through the Senate.
Following the confirmation hearing, he received unanimous votes
in both the Senate Committee and the Senate itself, although
reportedly one Southern Senator had prearranged stomach cramps
and left the chamber before the Senate vote was taken.
Goldberg had solicited the President-elect's promise that he
could choose his most important aides without patronage pressure
from the Kennedy political operation. He kept many of his
predecessor James Mitchell's senior professional staff. For the
important Under Secretary's position, he chose our distinguished
guest, Northwestern Law Professor Willard Wirtz, who had served
on the Wage Stabilization Board in World War II and was already
a noted arbitrator. To enforce the anti-corruption provisions of
Landrum-Griffin, Goldberg chose former NLRB member James J.
Reynolds, a self-described "liberal industrialist." Thus, the top
three positions at Labor mimicked a tripartite panel, with
Goldberg from Labor, Reynolds from management and Wirtz the
neutral or public representative. Goldberg also sent an important
message with other high level appointments: George Weaver, a
black who had worked for IUE, was named assistant secretary for
international affairs. Esther Peterson, a women, was appointed
head of the Women's Bureau. And Jerry Holleman, from the
AFL's traditional wing, was named to the third position in the
Department's chain of command. Later, Goldberg successfully
moved to have Peterson's position elevated to assistant secretary
status, emphasizing the importance of women's issues and making
Peterson the highest-ranking woman
in the Kennedy
administration.
Goldberg quickly assumed a prominent role in Kennedy's
cabinet. He opposed an incomes policy by economists Walter
Heller and John Kenneth Galbraith on the ground that it was too
close to being a wage and price control, a policy which would have
been unacceptable to business and labor.
Instead, Goldberg
suggested the administration implement a wage and price
guidelines policy really based on jawboning or persuasion and
voluntaristic methods rather than a heavy-handed policy enforced
by the government.
Goldberg believed that jawboning would be successful in
preventing, inflationary price and wage increases if strikes could
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be minimized, and he and his Labor Department staff employed
mediation to an unprecedented degree. In the first days of his
tenure as Secretary of Labor, Goldberg successfully mediated a
New York City tug and ferry boat workers' strike at the personal
request of Governor Nelson Rockefeller. And shortly afterwards
he successfully mediated a wildcat strike by commercial airline
pilots. He also urged Kennedy to intervene in a maritime strike by
80,000 longshoremen, convincing the President to invoke TaftHartley's national emergency disputes provisions. After the strike
was enjoined, the parties accepted the Taft-Hartley Board's
recommended settlement. Thus, early on, Goldberg demonstrated
a willingness to use the influence and power of his office to help
end strikes and to settle disputes. And the nation was rewarded
for this effort. Doctor Stebenne reports that during the first half of
1961, the nation lost the fewest working hours to strikes since
World War II.
It is worth reflecting at this point on the willingness of
Kennedy and Goldberg to act in these disputes. Goldberg's belief
that government could and should act in private labor disputes
with public ramifications is in stark contrast to our comparatively
hands-off approach of the last two decades. Influenced by his life
experiences, the depression, World War II, the Korean conflict, the
Cold War and the 50's recessions. Goldberg held the firm belief
that Government should take an active role in pursuing the public
good. He is most often remembered as a pragmatist rather than
an idealist, and it is true that he was a master at figuring out how
to get from here to there, whether in labor negotiations or political
matters. Nevertheless, what struck me the most about my
readings in preparation for this program was the firm anchoring of
Goldberg's world view in a set of ideals acquired early in the New
Deal. He favored the improvement of the lives of the working
class, the elimination of class, racial and gender barriers in
society, and he was a confirmed civil libertarian. Although he
spend his career as a labor attorney fighting for higher wages and
benefits and improved working conditions for workers, he was
conscious of long-term, broader considerations, such as business
competitiveness and national security. He was the sincerest type
of patriot. He did not believe that his country was without fault,
but he believed that our form of government was the best. For me,
the remarkable thing about him, and perhaps the most admirable
thing as well, was his ability to translate his ideals into action.
I was a teenager when Kennedy was elected in 1960, but I
remember the spirit of the campaign and the early months of his
administration. Perhaps the basic policies of the Eisenhower
administration, particularly in the labor area, differed very little
from those pursued by Kennedy and Goldberg. But the message
was not one of stasis. The key phrase of the day was, "Let us move
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ahead with vigor." And Goldberg took that rhetoric seriously in
the operation of the Labor Department. It is no longer fashionable
to believe in so active a government in pursuit of national
interests.
Today, successful politicians seem to build their
platforms on statements of what they are against, and by
advocating that government is the enemy. Goldberg understood
that government exists to serve the people, and he brought to the
Labor job the intelligence, experience and practical skills to do
good.
Where are such men and women today? We used to attract
them to government because our popular culture celebrated public
service as the highest calling, justifying the sacrifices such
exceptional individuals made when they came to serve. Today, our
public servants are more reviled than they are respected. When I
was a kid, there were no more respected people in the community
than police, fire fighters and teachers. I remember my parents
commenting on the loss of income a friend of the family suffered
when he moved from a lucrative law practice to the bench. Then,
public servants were honored. Not today. In 1961 or 1963, high
school students could tell you who the Secretary of Labor was. Not
today. (She is Alexis Herman). Even I have trouble remembering
who has been Secretary of Labor since Ray Marshall. In recent
years, we have lost the sense that government can act in the
public interest to improve our lives and those of people around the
world. And I believe the loss of that optimism in government's role
has caused the concomitant decline in interest in public service.
Until we recover the belief that government exists to serve, and
that it can and should serve the public interest, we shall attract
the leaders, politicians and public servants we deserve.
Goldberg was not merely satisfied with reacting to labor
disputes as they arose. He believed in positive programs and
active attention dealing with broader questions.
When the
Kennedy administration assumed office, wages were under
control, but the economy was contracting and unemployment was
rising. The administration sought renewed economic growth,
reductions in unemployment and an increase in workers' real
income. Kennedy was unwilling to accept all of Goldberg's ideas,
which included public-works programs, because he feared they
would create a budget deficit. Nor was he willing to accept
Goldberg's suggestion of an increase in taxes for the upper middle
class and rich. Kennedy eventually agreed to pursue a more
modest anti-recession package that included an increase in the
minimum wage and a temporary extension of unemployment
benefits. Although the package passed the House, it was initially
defeated in the Senate by an odd coalition of Southern
conservatives and Northern liberals who thought the bill too weak.
Calling on his Labor connections, Goldberg put pressure on the
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liberals, and the administration forced new votes which led to
passage of a scaled down version of the anti-recession program.
Goldberg pressed Kennedy to take the initiative on the issue
of racial discrimination, but Kennedy was reluctant for political
reasons., Goldberg was forced to accept less than he had hoped for,
in the form of the creation of the President's Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunity with Vice President Johnson as its
chair. That committee produced one major program, Plans for
Progress, which was designed to induce government contractors to
take voluntary steps to reduce discrimination in employment.
Goldberg was frustrated with the modest achievements of the
PCEEO, but political considerations prevented him from taking
more aggressive initiatives. Instead, he focused on leading by
example, by 'recruiting and promoting minority employees at the
Department of Labor. Other Goldberg initiatives designed to
break down discrimination barrier for blacks and Latinos were
thwarted.
Goldberg also supported measures designed to help women in
the workplace, including an equal pay law. But he was concerned
that an Equal Rights Amendment would ultimately operate to the
disadvantage of working women by weakening protective
legislation won during the New Deal and dividing the working
classes. Goldberg and his deputy, Esther Peterson, convinced
Kennedy to pass an executive order creating the President's
Commission on the Status of Women, which pushed for equal pay
With Goldberg's support Peterson shepherded
legislation.
versions of the equal pay bill through both houses of Congress only
to see it killed in the conference committee. Goldberg had to settle
for an executive order banning sex discrimination in employment
in the executive branch.
Goldberg also took the initiative in the area of industrial
relations. In the 1950's the post war social contract between
management and labor began to break down as managers in the
leading industries, including steel, sought to recover unilateral
control of wages, hours and conditions of employment. To deal
with the problems associated the so-called managerial revolt,
Goldberg urged the creation of a National Council of Labor
Management Advisers to devise wage and price policy. Kennedy
authorized the creation of the President's Advisory Committee on
Labor-Management Policy, which lacked the power of
implementation possessed by groups in statist systems in Western
Europe. The Advisory Committee was made up of prominent
business leaders (such as Henry Ford II and Thomas Watson of
IBM), union officials (such as George Meany and Walter Reuther)
and public members (such as George Taylor, Arthur Burns and
Clark Kerr).
The Committee addressed a wide range of workplace issues,

1999]

Arthur J. Goldberg

including the impact of automation, collective bargaining and
strikes, foreign competition and wage and price guidelines.
Although the Committee did not include the most recalcitrant of
the business leaders, particularly Roger Blough of U.S. Steel, the
subcommittees addressing the various issues bogged down over
both substantive and procedural matters, such as whether to issue
consensus reports or include dissents. Most of the solutions
considered early in the deliberations were substantially diluted by
the time reports were drafted, and Goldberg had to reconsider his
dream of emulating the Swedish corporatist system for controlling
inflation and addressing workplace issues. Instead, he embraced a
piece-meal approach using fact-finding, mediation and the
voluntary wage and price guidelines the Council of Economic
Advisers announced in January 1962. He would concentrate on
jawboning parties to labor contracts in leading industries in order
to establish patterns that would be followed by other companies in
the various sectors, such as steel.
Bargaining in the steel industry presented the first major test
for Goldberg's jawboning strategy.
Goldberg hoped that
negotiations between Kaiser Steel and the United Steelworkers
would provide the opportunity to establish the jawboning/pattern
bargaining system, and for a while it did. Kaiser and the USA,
which was represented by Marvin Miller in the bargaining, were
willing to work through the committee system with public
members providing fact-finding and mediation. But US Steel's
ability to set prices in the industry loomed like a giant shadow
over the Kaiser negotiations.
US Steel and its controversial CEO, Roger Blough, resisted
the tripartite structure, which would include public members on
joint committees. Early negotiating sessions alternated between
rancor and accommodation over issues involving crew size,
incentive pay and full employment guarantees. If the meantime,
bargaining at Kaiser took a turn for the worst when Kaiser
expressed its willingness to take a strike rather than accept a
formula for sharing profits with workers and guaranteed
employment for those displaced by technology. Goldberg, who had
watched from a distance for eight months, acted. Employing
jawboning, he urged the steel managers to change their position.
Goldberg convinced Kennedy to write the steel company executives
requesting that they not raise prices, as was rumored. The steel
executives were unhappy with the President's letter, but acceded
for the moment because they were concerned over the implied
threat of public intervention. Goldberg also convinced Union
President Dave McDonald, his former client, to agree to wage and
benefit increases well within productivity guidelines. After some
initial stalling, serious bargaining took place in January 1962.
Goldberg who was pushing for a quick settlement, arranged a
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meeting between Kennedy, himself, McDonald and Blough at the
White House. Kennedy urged McDonald to accept a new contract
within the CEA guidelines.
McDonald blustered a bit, but
eventually agreed. Blough, however, refused to go along with
Kennedy's call to hold the line on prices, and the meeting broke up
without agreement. Goldberg then worked on management to
restrain itself without making an explicit commitment not to raise
prices in return for union concessions on wages and benefits. He
hinted the alternative was more direct government intervention.
Fearing an industry shutdown would prompt government
intervention on the side of labor, management began to show
greater flexibility.
Goldberg then convinced the Steelworkers to accept a truce on
a wide range of issues and a modest compensation increase of
2.2%. Kaiser's CEO, Conrad Cooper, and US Steel's Blough
stopped making public statements about their right to raise prices
unilaterally, and on March 31, 1962, the parties announced a new
two-year contract.
It appeared that the administration's economic policy and
jawboning had worked. But the tacit commitment of US Steel not
to raise prices was the Achilles' heel of the deal. Ten days after
the agreement was announced, Blough visited the White House
and told the President U.S. Steel was distributing a press release
announcing a 3.5% price increase. Kennedy called Goldberg to the
Oval Office where Goldberg and Blough engaged in a tense
exchange. Goldberg told Bough he considered Blough's conduct
dishonest. After Blough left, Kennedy grew angry and took action
to force Blough to back down. The President delegated Treasury
Secretary Douglas Dillon to tell the financial community it would
fight the increase, and prevailed on Senator Estes Kefauver to
make a public statement that his Senate subcommittee would
investigate whether the steel companies violated anti-trust laws
by collusive pricing. In frustration, Goldberg offered to resign and
take responsibility for the crisis, but Kennedy put him off. Next,
Kennedy opened a televised press conference with a statement
blasting Blough and the other steel executives who had fallen in
behind the US Steel price increase.
He accused the steel
companies of acting in defiance of the public interest. Braced by
the President's performance, Goldberg withdrew his offer to resign
and joined in the pressure on the steel managers. Goldberg leaked
his offer to resign, an announcement that frightened the business
community, which feared a return to the acrimonious relations,
encountered during the Truman administration. Bethelhem Steel
was the first company to cave in, and Blough was forced to give in,
rescinding its price increase.
The experts are divided on their assessment of the Kennedy
administration's jawboning policy and its handling of the Steel
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negotiations. Some point out the victory was short-lived since the
steel companies simply raised prices gradually in increments over
the following months. Perhaps the outcome establishes there is no
middle ground between a government-controlled wage and price
system and totally unrestrained capitalism, that jawboning and
voluntary restrains cannot work. I, for one, do not believe that
any shortcomings in the implementation of the Goldberg policies
emanated from the peculiar circumstances of the time, including
the personalities involved. In sum, our leaders should not shy
away from devising and implementing policies designed to serve
the public interest. We learn from our mistakes, which should not
deter us from trying again. As an active neutral in the public
sector, I have observed that many of the techniques refined by
Goldberg, Wirtz and others thirty to forty years ago work quite
well. Arthur Goldberg didn't run away from challenges; he met
them with enthusiasm, intelligence and great skill. Our leaders
today would serve us well if they emulated him. Thank you.

